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ABSTRACT 
Some people are always better-off than others on desirable characteristics such as 
attractiveness, wealth, or intelligence. Moreover, such differences can often only be 
explained by arbitrary factors such as luck. Under these circumstances, how do we judge 
those favored by luck, particularly when we’re not? Do we hold them responsible for 
their fortune; do we become suspicious of them? I hypothesized that people negatively 
judge others who benefit from luck, especially when experiencing relative disadvantage. 
Specifically, others advantaged by luck should be liked less and perceived as less warm 
by those who did not have the same fortune. Furthermore, this effect on social judgments 
should hold particularly for individuals who believe in the deterministic power of luck or 
in luck as a personal characteristic. Prior research offers conflicting predictions about the 
role of luck in social judgments and ignores the impact of individuals’ beliefs in luck. In 
response, the present research attempted to offer clear and novel insights about the role 
that perceived luck plays in social judgment. Hypotheses were comprehensively 
addressed through three studies utilizing both correlational (Study 1) and experimental 
methods (Studies 2 and 3). Moreover, Study 3 examined whether the hypothesized effect 
on judgments of warmth reduces inter-personal trust in actual behavior. In general, the 
results reveal that perceived relative disadvantage predicts less positive social judgments 
of lucky others and that perceived luck can undermined social judgments of others.  
Keywords: Luck, Relative Disadvantage, Social Judgments, Social Comparison, Fairness 
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INTRODUCTION 
“A meritocracy is a system in which the people who are the luckiest in their health and 
genetic endowment; luckiest in terms of family support, encouragement, and, probably, 
income; luckiest in their educational and career opportunities; and luckiest in so many 
other ways difficult to enumerate -- these are the folks who reap the largest rewards.” 
   Ben S. Bernanke, 14th Chairman of the Federal Reserve (1953 - ) 
  
In his 2013 commencement speech at Princeton University, Bernanke stressed 
that factors like luck can influence important outcomes even when merit is the criterion. 
It is almost impossible to find domains in which luck does not have any effect. As luck 
goes around bestowing advantages, it gives some people an edge over others. In fact, a 
quick look at the social world reveals many people who are better-off than others just due 
to luck.  We all know others who were born in well-to-do families, were more talented 
from a very young age, or are naturally more intelligent or better-looking than us. For 
those who benefit from luck, it can be humbling to realize the role that luck played in 
their successes. But, more importantly, how do those forgotten by Lady Luck react to 
those blessed by her charms? I proposed that reactions to such luck-based inferiority have 
negative consequences on social judgment and co-operative behavior. This proposal 
builds on past research about dynamics of social judgment and inter-personal 
comparisons, while offering novel insights about how beliefs about luck color social 
perceptions and behaviors. Furthermore, it tests to what extent lay concerns and standards 
about fairness mirror philosophical proposals about the role that luck should play in 
moral judgment. 
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Overview 
In the pages that follow, I first review key constructs, namely those of luck and 
relative disadvantage. I also discuss important social judgments at the center of my 
research questions. Second, I point to limitations in existing psychological literature that 
reveal an ambiguity about how individuals considered to be lucky are viewed by others. 
Third, to eliminate this ambiguity, I underscore important factors that need consideration 
in order to illuminate the role of perceived luck in social judgments of others. These 
factors are the human need for competence, perceptions of fairness, and beliefs in luck. 
Moreover, I consider philosophical debates on ‘moral luck’, which suggest opposing 
views on whether fairness (or lack thereof) should impact social judgments of others. 
Fourth, based on these considerations, I outline the main hypotheses of the proposed 
research, and present pilot data that offer preliminary support for the hypotheses. Finally, 
I present data from three studies that test the impact of luck-based inferiority on social 
judgments by those worse-off of those better-off. In brief, all studies test the hypothesis 
that our own luck-based inferiority harms our impressions of others better-off and leads 
us to trust them less. 
Key Concepts 
I now define the concepts of luck, relative disadvantage, and luck-based 
inferiority in more detail. I also specify the aspects of social judgments and interpersonal 
impressions examined in this research. 
1. Luck 
Luck can be good or bad, and can refer to either events or circumstances. Usually, 
luck denotes the uncontrollable or unforeseen side to an event. First, luck can be the 
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uncontrollable causal force that brings about favorable or unfavorable results (Merriam-
Webster’s online dictionary, n.d.). For instance, winning one casino game after another 
might constitute being favored by Lady Luck. Second, luck can operate for or against an 
individual in the form of uncontrollable circumstances. For instance, being born in a 
well-to-do family would exemplify a circumstance tied with good luck. Unless qualified, 
the word “luck” usually refers to good luck (or fortune). 
Benefitting from Chance vs. Being Lucky. It is important to distinguish between 
chance and luck (Chandler & Spies, 1984; Fischhoff, 1976; Pritchard & Smith, 2004). 
Chance is considered a property of the environment—a force that is random and unstable. 
If a person benefits unexpectedly once, people will likely perceive it as an isolated event 
of chance’s making. No attributions might be made to the person who benefited from the 
random event. Importantly, chance is seen as a mechanism that distributes events fairly 
and evenly, unaffected by behavior (Keren, 1994).  
In contrast to the even-handed but unpredictable role of chance, being lucky is 
seen as a personal attribute. On the surface, the adjective “lucky” merely refers to 
someone who was able to benefit from luck. However, luck is often viewed as something 
personally detectable or usable in obtaining advantage (Friedland, 1998; Keren 
&Wagenaar, 1985). For example, winning one casino game after another can be 
construed as having personal control over chance-determined events (Langer & Roth, 
1975, p. 951). This perceived ability to attract luck could foster internal, stable 
attributions for good outcomes. Therefore, compared to benefiting from chance once, 
consistent favorable luck (or luckiness) should have more serious implications for how a 
person is viewed. 
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People appropriately acknowledge that they cannot control everything; therefore, 
chance and luck can play a role. The desire to be lucky suggests that people want to 
control even the uncontrollable factor of luck. Accordingly, the internet has no dearth of 
tips on how to become lucky. Some people believe in using lucky charms (Tobacyk & 
Milford, 1983; Tobacyk, 1988), yet others recommend optimism and recognizing 
opportunity (Wiseman, 2003). Others believe that being lucky comes from being 
prepared. As a popular quote goes, “I am a great believer in luck. The harder I work, the 
more of it I seem to have” (Cox, 1922).  
Although chance events often display unexpected streaks, observing consistently 
favorable events deviates from lay notions of fair and balanced works of chance (Teigen, 
1994). Therefore, lucky individuals might not just be seen as merely benefitting from 
chance. Instead, they might be perceived as playing an active role as an accomplice of 
luck, achieving what the person judging them is often trying to do him or herself (i.e., get 
lucky). This is supported by the finding that some people tend to habitually attribute the 
outcomes of random events to luck instead of chance, and that this tendency is driven by 
the need for control (Friedland, 1992, 1998). In this vein, the proposed research focused 
on reactions to individuals who are viewed as “lucky”, i.e., those who seem to 
systematically benefit from luck and not just randomly benefit from chance. 
2. Relative Disadvantage 
Although the key circumstance of interest has been described as luck-based 
inferiority, it is closer in meaning to relative disadvantage than a global sense of 
inferiority. Relative disadvantage arises when someone’s condition is less favorable 
compared to another party that is better-off. We all are aware of others who are wealthier, 
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healthier, or wiser than us. An individual might be smart-enough, attractive enough, or 
reasonably talented, but the same individual is relatively disadvantaged compared to 
someone who is better-off on any of those domains. Such upward comparison 
experiences are a ubiquitous aspect of social life (Festinger, 1954; Locke & Nekich, 
2000; Wheeler, 2000). 
Relative disadvantage is central to the research proposed herein because it has 
direct implications for the self. The Self-Evaluation Maintenance model (Tesser, 1988, 
1991) proposes that people are motivated to maintain positive feelings about the self and 
that relative disadvantage in important domains will often undermine such feelings, 
creating negative affect and motivations to restore one’s sense of competence. The 
strategies for preserving a positive sense of self can include avoiding the comparisons, 
distorting their meaning, or derogating and sabotaging the comparison target (Brickman 
& Bullman, 1977; Morse & Gergen, 1970; Smith, 2000; Tesser& Smith, 1980; Wills, 
1981; Wood, 1989).  
More generally, activation of the self typically increases social comparison 
tendencies and can direct focusing of attention on others (Muller & Butera, 2007; Stapel 
& Tesser, 2001). Moreover, activation of the self can yield stronger affective reactions to 
fair and unfair personal events (Van den Bos, Miedema, Vermunt, & Zwenk, 2011). 
Therefore, advantages of others that highlight our own important deficiencies present a 
much more important context for examining judgments of those advantaged by luck than 
do situations that have no implications for the self. In this vein, relative disadvantage 
received close scrutiny in this investigation. 
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3. Luck-Based Inferiority 
There are plenty of examples of social disparities that can only be attributed to 
luck. It is far from clear why some people are born in well-to-do families, or why some 
people are more talented from a very young age. To the extent that intelligence or looks 
are attributable to genes, one can infer an inherent randomness in how they are bestowed. 
Similarly, it might seem completely arbitrary that some people receive the right 
opportunities or breaks while others continue to miss them. For instance, every year 
50,000 aspiring immigrants are granted citizenship of the United States of America 
through a lottery, while others’ hopes are dashed (Jeffreys, 2005).  Similarly, some 
students’ familial legacies virtually ensure them admission to elite colleges and 
universities, while other competent students do not ever make the cut (Hurwitz, 2011).  
The questions about luck-based inferiority raised so far point to three different 
scenarios illustrated across the three cells in Figure 1. All the cells describe awareness of 
a target individual who enjoys a favorable outcome/circumstance. The favorable outcome 
is attributable to luck in cells A and C, but not in cell B. The favorable outcome puts an 
observer at a relative disadvantage in cells A and B, but not in cell C. Note that the 
highlighted cell A exemplifies luck-based inferiority. Comparisons of social judgments 
about target individuals in cell A with judgments of those in cells B and C will enable us 
to address questions about the unique roles of luck and inferiority, respectively. 
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 Luck present Luck absent 
Inferiority present A B 
No inferiority C  
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of social circumstances underlying luck-based 
inferiority. 
Understanding Luck-Based Inferiority. The main emphasis of this research is on 
interpersonal consequences of luck-based inferiority; specifically, on the kinds of social 
judgments we form of those who are better-off than us just due to luck. These judgments 
are described in more detail below. 
Social Judgments. The first social judgment of interest is liking. Many consider 
liking to be an automatic association that underlies all social contact (e.g., Cacioppo, 
Gardner, &Berntson, 1997). Liking captures a general positive attitude toward a target. 
Apart from liking, another key judgment in this work was perceived warmth. Warmth, 
along with competence, has been identified as one of two basic dimensions of person and 
group perception (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Judd, Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 
2005; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). The warmth dimension captures traits like 
friendliness, helpfulness, sincerity, trustworthiness and morality, whereas the competence 
dimension reflects traits like intelligence, skill, creativity and efficacy (Fiske et al., 2007). 
Thus, warmth denotes perceived intentions whereas competence denotes perceived ability 
to carry out those intentions. These two dimensions account for an impressive 82% of the 
variance in perceptions of everyday social behaviors (Wojciszke, Bazinska, &Jaworski, 
1998). More importantly, the placement of a person or a group along the warmth (along 
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with competence) dimension shapes emotional reactions and directs behaviors toward 
such a target (e.g., Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008). Perceptions of liking and warmth, 
therefore, provide a meaningful way to study interpersonal consequences toward 
beneficiaries of luck. Here onwards, the term ‘social judgments’ will refer specifically to 
judgments of liking and perceived warmth. 
Limitations in Previous Psychological Research 
Unfortunately, existing psychological literature does not provide clear answers 
about social judgments under luck-based inferiority. Two domains of work touch on the 
question of interest, but provide conflicting implications. The first domain involves 
studies which show that observing others benefit from luck elicits positive impressions of 
them. This Luck-Preference domain suggests that social judgments of lucky individuals 
will be positive, embodying liking and trust. The second domain comprises research on 
negative emotional reactions and judgments under relative disadvantage. As discussed 
below, this Envy domain suggests that social judgments of others (advantaged by luck) 
will be negative, marked by hostility and distrust. In sum, luck and relative disadvantage 
have been studied separately, leading to contradictory implications about interpersonal 
consequences of luck-based disparities. I now review these distinct domains of research 
and suggest ways to reconcile their findings in order to achieve a clear understanding 
about the impact of luck-based inferiority on social judgment. 
1. The Luck-Preference Domain. 
This domain constitutes a smaller number of studies that very closely address the 
issue of luck and judgments of those who benefit from it. In one such study, children 
were read vignettes describing other children who benefited from, or were victims of, 
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uncontrollable events (Olson, Banaji, Dweck, & Spelke, 2006). Children liked those who 
benefitted from uncontrollable events more than those who were victims. Another study 
showed that children expect that beneficiaries (vs. victims) of uncontrollable events are 
more likely to perform good actions (Study 1; Olson, Dunham, Dweck, Spelke & Banaji, 
2008). In other studies from the same research, the researchers showed that children 
believe that beneficiaries of uncontrollable events are nicer people. Adults also 
demonstrated more liking for individuals who benefitted from random good vs. bad 
events (Experiment 13; Olson, 2008). Thus, there is reason to believe that adults and 
children alike have a preference for people who benefit from chance or, are “lucky”. 
Olson and colleagues (2008) also showed that children associate “lucky” children with 
good intentions and “unlucky” children with bad intentions. For example, it was found 
that lucky children were believed to be less likely to get into a fight and more likely to 
share their toys. These authors thus labeled this phenomenon “luck preference”. 
However, several factors prohibit generalization of this apparent preference for 
the lucky to circumstances of luck-based inferiority or even to perceptions of lucky others 
more broadly. First, Olson and colleagues (2006, 2008) did not examine the role that 
judge’s disadvantages played in social judgments. None of the vignettes used in the 
studies put the participants at a relative disadvantage or were in any way self-relevant. In 
terms of situations represented in Figure 1, the “luck preference” studies only looked at 
the role of luck in the “no inferiority” level (Cell C). The researchers compared reactions 
toward targets that enjoyed favorable vs. unfavorable outcomes, without the target 
putting the observer at a relative disadvantage. 
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Second, what should one make of the finding that lucky targets elicited positive 
social judgments in these studies? As discussed earlier, people want to be lucky, and they 
want to be able to attract good luck. It is possible that the desire to be lucky oneself can 
elicit feelings of admiration when faced with a lucky individual. Thus, when good events 
happen to others with no implications for the self, it should be no surprise that people 
react positively (Cialdini & Richardson, 1980; Tesser, 1988). However, it is questionable 
whether people would react positively when comparatively disadvantaged by luck. Thus, 
studies that demonstrate “luck preference” leave much to be desired when it comes to 
understanding perceptions of lucky individuals in the context of social comparison. 
Moreover, these studies did not address behavioral consequences of perceiving others as 
lucky. 
Third, Olson and colleagues did not examine how people who consistently get 
lucky (i.e., those favored by “Lady Luck”) are perceived. Vignettes used in their studies 
only focused on targets that had one lucky or unlucky event happen to them. Given that a 
single lucky event might be seen as the making of chance instead of luck, findings of 
Olson and colleagues likely demonstrate perceptions of those who benefit from “chance” 
instead of luck. Although “lucky” individuals in the studies were perceived favorably, it 
is not clear whether those who consistently benefit from luck will also be perceived 
similarly. When a person seems to get lucky all the time, tables might be turned.  
2. The Envy Domain. 
An alternative perspective emerges from research on social comparison, relative 
disadvantage, and envy, neither of which explicitly considers the effect of luck. This 
perspective relies on findings that link relative disadvantage with negative emotions. 
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When the relative disadvantage is perceived as unfair (likening it to relative deprivation), 
anger and resentment are its essential affective consequences (Crosby, 1976; Folger, 
1987; Martin, 1986; Runciman, 1966; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984). More generally, 
upward social comparisons often lead to envy, hostility, and occasional gloating at 
others’ misery when others’ advantage is beyond our grasp (Krizan & Johar, 2012; 
Krizan & Smith, 2014; Leach & Spears, 2008; Smith & Kim, 2007; Smith, Turner, 
Leach, Garonzik, Urch-Druskat, & Weston, 1996; Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, &Pieters, 
2009). Thus, it can be argued that the relatively advantaged individual would not be liked 
amidst negative emotions like envy and resentment (but see Feather and Sherman, 2002). 
Consistent with this reasoning, in a field study bank employees disliked co-workers who 
were promoted, seemingly due to envy (Schaubroeck and Lam, 2004). Similarly, 
relatively advantaged groups (e.g., wall-street brokers) often become associated with ill-
intentions, given envied groups and individuals are generally perceived as competent but 
cold and untrustworthy (Fiske et al., 2007). Thus, those better-off might not only be 
disliked, but specifically perceived as less moral and ethical (i.e., warm). 
However, research on envy and resentment does not allow isolating the role of 
luck within the context of relative disadvantage, given that the process by which 
disadvantage is created is not typically manipulated. Studies that did pay attention to the 
process of allocation either involved other confounds like the lack of effort (e.g., Feather 
& Sherman, 2002), or did not explicitly manipulate the process of allocation (e.g., Cohen-
Charash & Mueller, 2007). In this latter study, participants recalled a person who was 
better than them and provided ratings of envy and fairness in that situation (Cohen-
Charash & Mueller, 2007 Study 1). Counterproductive work behaviors (loafing, 
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sabotage) were found to be more strongly related to envy when greater unfairness was 
perceived. 
Thus, past research does not help to fully understand the role that perceived luck 
plays in social judgments within contexts of relative disadvantage. In terms of situations 
represented in Figure 1, research relevant to the envy domain seems to generally compare 
cell C with cells A and B combined. In order to isolate the role of luck it is important to 
contrast two targets of comparison in the same circumstances, with the exception of the 
role of luck in creating those circumstances (i.e., contrast cell A with B). Regardless, the 
research in this domain suggests that others who are advantaged by sheer luck might 
receive the wrath of resentful and envious reactions, undermining liking, perceived 
warmth, and trust.  
In sum, the extant literature does not offer a clear conclusion about the role of 
luck in shaping social judgments under relative disadvantage. Not only is it not clear 
whether reactions will be positive or negative, it is also unclear how differences in luck 
(not chance) affect social judgments of those better-off. The current research addressed 
these theoretical and empirical gaps in three studies. First, I focused on reactions to 
individuals explicitly viewed as benefiting from luck as opposed to chance. Second, to 
examine the unique role of luck in social judgments, Study 2 compared people’s reactions 
to advantaged individuals who only differed in the extent to which luck was responsible 
for their advantage (cell A vs. B, Figure 1). Third, to examine the role of self-relevance, 
Study 3 compared reactions toward lucky individuals who differ in the extent to which 
their outcomes put an observer at a disadvantage (cell A vs. C, Figure 1). Specifically, 
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peoples’ reactions to two lucky individuals were compared, whereby only the success of 
one was (relatively) disadvantageous for the observer. 
Routes from Luck-Based Inferiority to Social Judgments 
In order to better understand people’s reactions to others advantaged by luck, 
three important factors need to be considered. In this section, I discuss these factors: the 
need for competence, perceived unfairness, and beliefs in luck. Each of these factors 
contributes to understanding inter-personal consequences of luck-based inferiority, and I 
will underscore implications of each. 
1. Need for Competence 
Earlier I argued that luck-based inferiority should have a potent effect on people 
when the self is involved. One way in which this can happen is through impact on human 
need satisfaction (Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Sheldon, Elliot, Kim, & Kassser, 2001; 
Tesser, 1988). The need most relevant here is the need for competence, identified as a 
core psychological need by multiple theorists (e.g., Bandura, 1977; Deci & Ryan, 2000; 
White, 1959). Competence refers to the ability to have an effect on the environment and 
to attain valued outcomes within it. Moreover, psychosocial experiences of mastery and 
effectance are crucial to happiness and well-being (as described in self-determination 
theory; Deci & Ryan, 2000). 
Luck-based differences restrict the experience of competence in at least two ways. 
First, superiority of someone means that one is less competent, at least in the domain of 
comparison (Johar & Krizan, 2014; White, 1959). For instance, a smarter colleague might 
pose tough competition, thus having implications for one’s career prospects and self-
perceptions of ability. Second, luck thwarts the sense of control because it is not clear 
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how one might improve one’s standing (given that luck should be uncontrollable by 
definition). Thus, someone who is better due to luck might be perceived as a double 
threat to one’s need for competence and should therefore elicit negative social judgments 
and emotional reactions (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Brickman & Bulman, 
1977; Morse & Gergen, 1970; Weiner, 1986). 
However, there is not enough existing evidence to conclude that luck-based 
inferiority necessarily thwarts the need for competence. Although it makes sense that role 
of luck in another person’s advantage can thwart one’s need for competence, the 
perceived luck could also absolve oneself from responsibility for one’s inferiority (e.g., 
“It’s not about me if I can’t control it”). In this case, luck might actually help regain the 
undermined sense of control. If so, negative reactions toward the lucky individual might 
not arise. Given such contradicting possibilities, the proposed research on the effect of 
luck-based inferiority on social judgment is that much more necessary. 
2. Perceptions of Fairness 
Another important underlying factor in social judgments under inequality is 
justice or fairness (the terms will be used interchangeably). It cannot be overemphasized 
that people’s views about what is just or fair are a social facilitator through which the 
interaction among people and groups is enabled (Tyler, 2000). That one person has more 
due to luck is essentially a problem of distribution of resources. An important question 
then is can we identify what is unfair about Lady Luck’s kindness toward one person 
over another? Another related issue is that of “moral luck”. Even if we label a situation as 
unfair (or wrong), is it justified to form a moral judgment of people who happen to be in 
that situation? I next discuss both questions in detail. 
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Unfairness of luck-based inequalities. Does good luck (or a lucky individual) 
violate any code of fairness or justice, and if so, which one? To facilitate the discussion, I 
describe twoaspects of fairness: distributive and procedural fairness. Distributive fairness 
deals with outcomes: who gets how much? Procedural fairness deals with underlying 
decision making procedures: how was it determined who should get what? It is important 
to distinguish between procedural and distributive fairness because fairness concerns of 
people involve questions about procedures through which outcomes are obtained, as well 
as the outcomes themselves (Thibaut & Walker, 1975).  
 Different principles or standards can be employed to determine fairness. For 
example, distributive fairness is reflected by norms for equality (Forsyth, 2006). It is 
important that every individual gets the same outcome (e.g., equal pay for equal work, 
see Rawls, 1971). If any individual gets less or more, then equality would be violated and 
outcomes would be considered unfair in a distributional sense. Procedural fairness, on the 
other hand, reflects the nature of procedures—whether everyone has an opportunity for 
input in the decision-making process. For example, if people do not get voice, procedural 
fairness is compromised and people are less satisfied with their outcomes (Van den Bos, 
2007). In many cases, what is ultimately judged as fair can be a complex combination of 
distributive and procedural fairness. 
 Luck egalitarianism. Critically, luck-based inferiority is not amenable to any 
simple standard of fairness. On the one hand, luck is uncontrollable and should thus 
absolve the person benefiting from it from any moral judgment. On the other hand, luck 
could be seen to violate both distributive fairness (due to unequal outcomes) and 
procedural fairness (given the arbitrariness of the allocation). Therefore, a more complex 
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standard of fairness may be needed to better understand the perceptions of unfairness 
under luck-based inferiority. The principle of luck egalitarianism is one such standard of 
fairness most relevant to the current research. It can help to illustrate exactly what kinds 
of moral codes are violated when luck favors one individual over another. 
The following quote sums up the essence of luck egalitarianism: “There is 
injustice in distribution when the inequality of goods reflects not such things as 
differences in the arduousness of different people’s labors, or people’s different 
preferences and choices with respect to income and leisure, but myriad forms of lucky 
and unlucky circumstance” (Cohen 2000, p. 130). Therefore, as per luck egalitarianism, 
differences among people are unfair if those differences result not from peoples’ choices 
and effort, but from forces beyond their control. Achieving luck egalitarianism can also 
be understood as one of the goals of distributive justice (Arneson 1989, 2000; Cohen 
1989; Dworkin 2003). For example, someone who is naturally better-looking than me did 
nothing to obtain the advantage which is just handed down by genes. To the extent that I 
believe in luck egalitarianism, I would take issue with the unfair distribution of good 
looks. 
In sum, the fact that distribution of resources (in the above example, 
attractiveness) is governed by luck might be construed as a violation of the standard of 
justice prescribed by the principle of luck egalitarianism. It is noteworthy that there is no 
direct empirical evidence regarding whether people actually accept this way of thinking 
or behave as luck egalitarians in their daily lives. In other words, it is unclear whether 
people use the principle of luck egalitarianism to judge fairness of everyday situations. 
The proposed research speaks directly to this issue. 
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 Moral luck. Equally relevant is the question philosophers have grappled with for 
centuries: should a person be evaluated based on an action, event, or circumstance even 
though the action is not within the actor’s own control (Nagel, 1979; Williams, 1981)? 
This debate on “moral luck” is far from being settled. Let us take the classic example of 
two law-abiding drivers (A and B). One of the drivers (A) was met with an unforeseen 
situation—a child came running in front of the car. Despite all efforts to avoid hitting the 
child, driver A could not prevent it. Driver B faced no tragic event. Although driver A is 
not responsible for hitting the child, the child did get hit when A was driving. Do we 
judge A as less moral than B? Legal implications of hitting a child suggest that as a 
society we do judge driver A as less moral (Zipursky, 2008). Whether it is justified to do 
so or not remains debatable. 
Culpability in Moral Luck. A similar situation arises under conditions of luck-
based inferiority. The principle of luck egalitarianism suggests that luck-based 
differences are a violation of fairness. Although lucky individuals themselves might not 
have perpetrated the violation of luck egalitarianism, if it were not for them, the luck-
based inferiority would clearly not manifest. It remains an open question whether lucky 
individuals are themselves to blame (as in the case of the unlucky driver). The 
philosophical debate on ‘moral luck’ focuses exactly on the question: should people be 
judged for (wrong) actions that they are not themselves responsible for. Importantly, 
analyses of ‘moral luck’ suggest the possibility that an advantaged lucky individual is 
held responsible for the good luck (as a violator of luck egalitarianism). The current 
research empirically addressed this question. 
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In sum, do people hold actors responsible for actions that were not under their 
control, specifically in the context of luck-based inferiority? If so, people would judge the 
lucky individuals as less warm and like them less. In a sense, people may end up blaming 
the lucky individuals for their luck. One underlying mechanism might involve judgments 
of deservingness. Feather (1999) argued that reactions to others’ success or failure 
depend on the degree to which outcomes are seen as deserved, that is whether they co-
exist with good behavior, effort, or intentions. Advantages contingent largely on luck 
would thus seem to render the lucky individual undeserving. Accordingly, negative 
reactions should follow (Feather & Sherman, 2002). Another mechanism that should link 
violation of fairness with negative impressions of individuals in unfair situations is 
evaluative conditioning. Evaluative conditioning is a specific type of associative learning 
where neutral stimuli become valenced simply by their association with another valenced 
object, face, taste or scent, after as little as one instance of association (Hofmann, De 
Houwer, Perugini, &Baeyens, 2010; Soderberg & Sherman, 2013; Todd &Burgmer, 
2013; for a review see DeHouwer, Thomas, &Baevens, 2001). So, perceptions of the 
lucky individual—even if a neutral stimulus to begin with—might become colored by the 
way the situation is perceived, i.e., as unjust and unfair. 
3. Beliefs in Luck. 
Individual differences in beliefs about luck suggest that not all people would 
interpret luck-based inequality in the same way. Therefore, considering the nature of 
peoples’ beliefs about luck is crucial when trying to understand reactions to luck-based 
inferiority. Factor analyses of lay beliefs point to at least two distinct aspects of peoples’ 
beliefs in luck  (André, 2006; Bridgstock, Marais, & Sturgess, 2011; Darke& Freedman, 
19 
 
1997a & b; Day & Maltby, 2003; Maltby, Day, Gill, Colley, & Wood, 2008; Thompson 
& Prendergast, 2012). The first is a general belief in luck, i.e., whether individuals 
believe in the existence of luck as a deterministic phenomenon (Thompson & 
Prendergast, 2012). The second is personal luckiness, i.e., the extent to which people 
believe that they themselves have deterministic luck or the ability to detect and direct the 
uncontrollable force that luck is supposed to be (Maltby et al., 2008; Thompson & 
Prendergast, 2012).  
When considering how people react to luck-based inferiority, beliefs in luck likely 
play a key role. People who do not believe in the deterministic capacity of luck might not 
attribute their relative disadvantage to luck. Such people might conclude that the 
seemingly lucky individual deserved the advantage for some reason, or that the lucky 
person was an unintended beneficiary of pure chance. Consequently, they might not see 
the lucky individual in a negative light. However, there is no empirical evidence 
regarding consequences of such beliefs about luck. In addition, the potential belief in 
one’s own personal luckiness suggests another painful social comparison. In this situation 
the inferior individual might also feel additionally short-changed for being personally less 
lucky, in addition to lacking the desired outcome that the lucky individual enjoys. This 
might strengthen the sense of inferiority and the associated emotional reactions, as 
discussed above. 
The above considerations are key to understanding the role that luck-based 
inferiority plays in social judgments of lucky individuals. Importantly, they suggest two 
distinct possibilities: luck-based inferiority may lead to negative social judgments and 
interpersonal consequences, or may have little or no impact given luck is a factor external 
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to an individual. The extant empirical research literature also points toward these 
conflicting possibilities, but it tends to be limited in research design and the ability to 
accurately predict reactions to luck-based inferiority.  
Hypotheses 
 Overview. In an attempt to resolve conflicting possibilities posed by past research, 
I used a more systematic way of understanding social judgments under conditions of 
luck-based inferiority. In general, I hypothesized that relative disadvantage of the 
observer is central to how people react to luck-based inequality. Specifically, perceived 
relative disadvantage and the perceived role of luck in another’s advantage should 
negatively affect social judgments of that individual. These predictions stem from a 
premise that reactions to luck-based inferiority are influenced by a thwarted need for 
competence, lay beliefs in luck egalitarianism, and negative associations regarding others 
within unfair situations. Although luck (in another’s advantage) should undermine 
competence and activate fairness concerns more generally, these effects should be 
strengthened by one’s own self-relevant disadvantage. Finally, beliefs in luck are 
expected to augment these reactions. Lack of belief in luck should allow people to 
dismiss the role of luck in luck-based inferiority. Conversely, stronger beliefs in luck or 
personal luckiness should lead to less positive social judgments. 
The Role of Relative Disadvantage. The role of relative disadvantage (and self-
relevance) is central to this inquiry. Two hypotheses address the role of relative 
disadvantage in luck-based inferiority. These hypotheses are based on the heightened 
involvement of self under relative disadvantage. Self-involvement orients one toward 
social comparison and toward deeper processing of the implications thereof. When luck-
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based differences lead to relative disadvantage, people should experience a stronger 
thwarting of the need for competence and the inequality would be perceived as a 
violation of fairness. First, I hypothesized that lucky individuals would be liked less when 
they are relatively advantaged. I also hypothesized that these lucky individuals would be 
perceived as less warm. Although these two hypotheses were experimentally examined 
only in Study 3, they were also explored in Studies 1 and 2. 
The Role of Luck. The next two hypotheses address the unique role of luck in 
social judgments. First, I hypothesized that people who view luck itself as responsible for 
the success of advantaged individuals would be especially likely to like less those 
benefiting from it. Second, I hypothesized that people who view luck itself as responsible 
for the success of advantaged individuals would also be especially likely to perceive 
those who benefit from luck as less warm and having ill intentions (i.e., being less moral, 
ethical, or trustworthy). 
Hypotheses about the role of luck provided an empirical test of the propositions 
regarding ‘moral luck’. I proposed that agents should be judged for outcomes associated 
with them despite a lack of objective agency or formal responsibility. In keeping with the 
principle of luck egalitarianism, it is unjust that some people benefit merely due to luck. 
Thus, the situation (luck-based disparity) might come to be perceived as unfair. As 
discussed before, perceptions of un-deservingness and evaluative conditioning should 
undermine social judgments of lucky individuals. 
Beliefs about luck. The hypotheses discussed so far are based on the assumption 
that people are able to attribute circumstances of lucky individuals to luck itself. 
However, not all believe in the deterministic power of luck, nor to the same degree 
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(Thompson & Prendergast, 2012; Friedland, 1998). Those with strong beliefs in luck 
should pay more attention to the role played by luck in the lives of lucky individuals. 
Also, those with weak beliefs in luck might attribute outcomes to chance instead of luck. 
Accordingly, the effect of luck on the way lucky individuals are perceived might be even 
stronger as beliefs in luck become stronger. Therefore, I hypothesized a complex effect of 
beliefs in luck. Stronger general beliefs in luck should predict stronger attributions to 
luck, which in turn should be negatively associated with social judgments. In this vein, I 
hypothesized that the effect of belief in luck will be mediated by attributions to luck. 
Study Overview 
I now describe three studies that will address the above hypotheses in various 
settings. In each study participants reported attributions of the outcomes of another 
individual to luck. Each study focused on a different aspect of the link between luck and 
social judgments (of liking and perceived warmth). Study 1 examined the extent to which 
perceived luck predicts reactions toward actual lucky individuals in participants’ lives. 
Participants reported what they thought of real individuals from their lives, those who 
benefitted from luck. In Study 2, the role of luck in shaping reactions to the advantaged 
was experimentally isolated. Participants read about a relatively advantaged individual 
who either benefited from luck or not. 
Study 3 explicitly tested the role of self-relevance in luck-based inferiority. 
Participants observed a confederate repeatedly win a luck-game, thus creating the 
impressions of luckiness. Relative disadvantage of the participant was experimentally 
manipulated by allowing the participant to first play and lose the same game or making 
the participant a neutral observer. Thus, good outcomes of the lucky individual should or 
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should not create a direct comparative disadvantage, contingent on the role of the 
participant (observer vs. loser). In addition, Study 3 assessed potential consequences of 
lower perceived warmth through a behavioral measure of trust. Specifically, participants 
were led to believe that they had the opportunity to share some money with the winning 
confederate, with the expectation of a return. The more money they shared, the bigger 
return they could expect. Participants would not share bigger amounts unless they trust 
the intentions of the confederate. This behavioral measure allowed examining whether 
the effects of perceived luck in others’ advantage can be generalized to behavior 
reflecting trust in another. Thus, Study 3 went beyond self-reported reactions toward the 
lucky individual as it assessed actual inter-personal behavior. 
Pilot Data 
 Data from two pilot studies provided preliminary support for the hypothesis that 
attributing others’ success to luck leads to negative impressions and lower trust. In the 
first pilot study, two-hundred and fifty four student participants imagined a summer 
internship wherein they worked in supervised same-sex pairs. They also imagined that at 
the end of the internship all employees received bonuses. Despite equal performance, the 
teammate received a bigger bonus than the participant. Participants reported the extent to 
which (they thought) the bigger bonus of the teammate was attributable to luck. 
Participants also rated how much they liked the teammate and perceived the teammate as 
warm. Attributions to luck were negatively correlated with both liking and perceived 
warmth (r’s=-.16, -.19, respectively, p’s<.05). 
 In the second pilot study, ninety-five participants read news articles about a 
successful businessman, a female super-model, and a high-status student peer at their 
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university. Participants then rated the degree to which success of different target 
individuals was attributable to luck, and also reported the extent to which they liked the 
persons and perceived them as warm. Attributions to luck were negatively correlated with 
perceived warmth in all three cases (r’s=-.30, p’s<.01). Although correlations with liking 
were negative, they did not reach significance (the correlation in the case of the high-
status student peer was -.10).Thus, both pilot studies suggested that attributions to luck 
are linked to negative social judgments, specifically to lower liking and perceived 
warmth.  
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PART I. THE LUCKY ONES IN OUR LIVES 
Although it is intuitive that people pay attention to the role of luck in the lives of 
people they know, it was important to test this assumption empirically. Therefore, I 
started by examining people’s encounters with lucky individuals in their day-to-day life. 
Participants recalled individuals who they considered especially lucky. Participants 
briefly described this person’s life. Subsequently, participants answered questions about 
both the lucky individual and themselves. Thus, Study 1 allowed examining whether luck 
colors perceptions of people in real life. 
Method 
Participants. A hundred and sixty-two students (66% female, mean age 19.2 
years) from a large Midwestern university completed the study in exchange for partial 
course credit. Ten participants failed to describe any person known to them, suggesting 
potentially flippant responses. Additionally, three participants said that they did not know 
anybody who they would consider to be “lucky”. Accordingly, these participants were 
dropped from the analysis. Thus, the total sample size was a hundred and forty-nine. This 
allowed sufficient power (80%) to detect even a modest correlation of .25 (Cohen, 1988). 
Procedures & Measures. All procedures were completed online. Participants read 
provided the following prompt: 
“Often uncontrolled and unforeseen factors shape our lives, getting in our way or 
helping us along. Think of someone you know whose path rarely seems to be hindered by 
unpredictable factors, that is, someone who seems to have things often go their way due 
to forces external to them. After you have identified such a person in your social circle, 
please take a moment to reflect on them and your experiences with them. In the space 
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below, please describe this person and highlight some examples of favorable outcomes 
they experienced or ways in which they benefited from external factors. Also, please 
describe what you think about this person and whether you have an actual relationship.” 
Questions about the lucky individual. Subsequently, participants completed 
several questionnaires. They reported the duration for which they had known the lucky 
individual. They classified their relationship with that individual (e.g., stranger, 
acquaintance, friend, sibling, parent, etc.). Next, they rated their emotional reactions (see 
Appendix A) toward this individual on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 11 (a great amount), 
e.g., liking for, angry at, envious of, pleased for, etc. To measure the feeling of relative 
disadvantage responses to emotional reactions such as depressed, self-lacking, inferior to, 
ashamed of yourself were aggregated into a dejection index. Subsequently, participants 
made attributions of the lucky individual’s collective outcomes to luck on a scale of 1 
(Not At All) to 5 (Very Much). I will use the term luck-attribution to refer to this 
measure. 
In the final questionnaire about the lucky individual, participants rated personality 
impressions regarding that individual on a scale of 0 (Not At All) to 11 (A Great 
Amount) e.g., “likeable”, “arrogant”, “selfish”, etc. Responses to two items were 
aggregated to measure liking: “liking for” and “likeable” (both measured on a scale of 0 
to 11). Perceived warmth was measured as an aggregate of the following personality 
impression ratings, namely arrogant, selfish, friendly, genuine, trustworthy, self-centered, 
conceited, dishonest, and moral. Negatively-valenced items were reverse coded. 
Luck-Belief Scales. I use the term “luck-belief scales” to refer to different scales 
used to measure beliefs related to luck (Appendix D). Among these scales were the belief 
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in luck and luckiness scale (BILLS; Thompson & Prendergast, 2012), the belief in good 
luck scale (BIGL; Darke, 1997) and the Darke and Freedman beliefs around luck scale 
(DFBALS; Maltby, et al., 2008). The BILLS (five-points; 1=Strongly Disagree, 
5=Strongly Agree) includes a general belief-in-luck subscale, which measures the extent 
to which people believe that luck can influence outcomes in peoples’ lives, e.g., “I 
believe in good and bad luck”, “There is no such thing as good or bad luck “, “Good and 
bad luck really do exist”, “Luck doesn’t affect what happens to me”, “Belief in luck is 
completely sensible”, and, “Luck only exists in peoples’ minds”. The BILLS also 
contains a beliefs in personal luckiness subscale, e.g., “I mostly have bad luck”, “I’m not 
lucky”, “I generally have good luck”, “I consider myself a lucky person”, “Bad luck 
happens to me often”, and “I’m usually lucky”. Negatively worded items will be reverse 
coded. 
The BIGL (six-points; 1=Strongly Disagree, 6=Strongly Agree) measures 
individual differences in the irrational view of luck as a stable force, which can influence 
events in one’s favor. This scale contains items such as “I consistently have good luck” 
and “Luck works in my favor”. The DFBALS (six-points; 1=Strongly Disagree, 
6=Strongly Agree) scale has four subscales, namely general-belief-in-luck (e.g., “Some 
people are consistently lucky, and others are unlucky”), rejection-of-beliefs-in-luck (e.g., 
“Being unlucky is nothing more than random”), belief-in-being-lucky (e.g., “I 
consistently have good luck”), and belief-in-being-unlucky (e.g., “I consistently have bad 
luck”). 
Thus, the three luck-belief scales comprised seven scores (one score for each 
subscale). In order to extract belief-in-luck and personal luckiness factors from the 
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measures of luck-related beliefs, I conducted a principal-factors analysis (with oblimin 
rotation) on the seven measures of luck-related beliefs with the aim of extracting two 
correlated belief factors. The analysis revealed two factors with an eigenvalue greater 
than one (accounting for 31% and 28% of the variance after rotation) and scree-plot as 
well as parallel analysis supported a two-factor solution (Horn, 1965). The factor 
loadings from the pattern matrix (controlling for factor dependence) are shown in Table 1 
and represent the two factors of general belief-in-luck and belief in personal luckiness 
(which correlated .02). Examining factor loadings confirms that belief in the 
deterministic power of luck is separate from the belief in personal luckiness and supports 
the work of Thompson and Prendergast (2012). Critically, I derived factor scores 
corresponding to two factors from the luck-belief scales. These factor scores were then 
linked to social judgments. 
Results 
Characteristics of the Lucky Individuals. On average, participants had known the 
lucky individuals for eight years and eleven months (ranging from zero months to 
twenty-one years and one month). Roughly 39 percent of the lucky individuals were 
classified as close friends, 20 percent as friends, 10 percent as siblings, and 10 percent as 
acquaintances. The remaining fourteen percent were classified as members of one’s 
extended family, parents, romantic partners, or strangers.  
Descriptions of lucky individuals contained a wealth of interesting information. 
One rater read and classified all the descriptions. The rater assessed whether a participant 
described feeling relatively disadvantaged compared to the lucky individual. 
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Furthermore, the rater classified the kinds of advantage and the relationship with the 
lucky individual in the description.  
Advantages Enjoyed by the Lucky Individuals. The advantage enjoyed by the 
lucky individual was classified via the coding system used successfully by Krizan and 
Johar (2012) to identify distinct real-life comparison domains. Roughly 44 percent had 
good achievements (e.g., grades, finding a job), 30 percent of the individuals enjoyed 
some ability (e.g., intelligence, artistic talent, athletic ability), 22 percent enjoyed a 
desirable personality trait (e.g., friendliness, emotional stability) and nineteen percent 
enjoyed good financial background (e.g., family wealth). Those noted for physical 
attractiveness, coveted possessions (e.g., car, house), or having good relationships (e.g., 
closeness with parents, romantic partner) each constituted roughly eight percent. Finally, 
about 20 percent enjoyed some unlikely experiences (e.g., winning money at casinos, 
winning last-minute tickets to a concert, etc.). The total percentage is greater than 
hundred because many individuals were described as having multiple advantages. The 
following is a description provided by one participant: 
My friend … seems to have a pretty easy life. Things just kind of click for her. Last 
year, she moved to a new town, found a new job and a new boyfriend, and found a 
new circle of friends, all within the span of a few months. She didn't seem to try too 
hard -- it all just seemed to happen for her. Her financial situation is great - she 
found a good job after not a lot of searching, and lives in a really nice place and 
drives a really nice car. The thing is, I don't feel like she's had to deal with any 
struggles at all. I attempted to do the same thing this year (moving to a new town, 
starting a new life, etc.) and it has been a pretty awful experience. Everything seems 
  
TABLE 1. Factor Loadings of Luck-Belief scales and subscales 
Note. The coefficients represent unique factor loadings from a Principal Factors Analysis with Oblimin rotation 
 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
 Factor1 
Deterministic luck 
Factor2 
Personal luck 
Factor1 
Deterministic luck 
Factor2 
Personal luck 
Factor1 
Deterministic luck 
Factor2 
Personal luck 
BILLS       
   Belief-in-luck .61 -.10 .68 -.16 .66 -.22 
   Belief in personal luckiness -.27 .94 .13 .91 .09 .88 
BIGL .67 .59 .98 .11 .98 .13 
DFBALS       
   Unlucky .64 -.40 .27 -.73 .13 -.78 
   Lucky .36 .73 .60 .35 .58 .50 
   Reject -.03 -.15 -.48 .01 -.50 .08 
   General .86 .03 .78 -.22 .67 -.41 
Variance explained (%) 31 28 39 23 35 27 
3
0
 
31 
 
to be acting against me - my job is awful, I don't have any friends, etc. I don't 
understand why it was so easy for her, but it's so difficult for me. 
Although relative disadvantage was not explicitly mentioned, a considerable 
proportion of the descriptions provided by participants denoted relative disadvantage 
scenarios (like the one above). A high prevalence of relative disadvantage in participants’ 
descriptions suggested that exposure to others benefitting from luck is meaningful for 
social comparison. 
Table 2. Study 1 correlations: Luck-attributions, social judgments, and luck-beliefs 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Dejection 3.75 2.24 1      
2. Luck Attribution 3.30 1.17 .22** 1     
3. Like 8.85 2.52 -.27** -.09 1    
4. Warmth 7.99 2.40 -.33** -.15† .79** 1   
5. Deterministic Luck - - .18* .19* -.08 -0.15† 1  
6. Personal Luckiness - - -.11 -.03 .12 0.02 0.01 1 
Note. ** p<.01, * p<.05,† p<.08 (N’s between 143-149) 
Social Judgments of the Lucky Individual. Means in Table 1 suggest that the lucky 
individuals were liked a lot and that their perceived warmth was high. Given that these 
individuals were close to the participants (most were classified as friends or close 
friends), it is understandable that social judgments toward them were generally positive. 
Regardless, I hypothesized that perceived relative disadvantage, perceived role of luck in 
another’s advantage, and lay luck-beliefs should predict less positive social judgments of 
the lucky individual. 
Relative disadvantage, measured via the dejection index, seemed to play a clear role. 
Participants’ reports of dejection were associated with their social judgments. Owing to 
negative correlations in Table 2, lucky individuals that elicited higher dejection seemed 
to be less liked and perceived as less warm. 
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Although luck attributions predicted less positive social judgments, as hypothesized, 
these associations were weak. Luck-attribution predicted lower perceived warmth at r = -
.15 (p<.08). Whereas luck-attribution negatively correlated with liking -.09, the 
correlation was not significant. 
Luck-beliefs did play a role, albeit a small one. Deterministic luck predicted less 
perceived warmth at r = -.15 (p<.08). Similar correlations were found between the 
deterministic luck and liking, and between personal luckiness and both social judgments. 
However, these weak links failed to reach significance. 
I also hypothesized that luck-beliefs would intensify the effect of luck-attributions on 
social judgments. This was observed in the case of warmth. In a multiple regression, 
luck-attributions interacted with deterministic luck to predict warmth, F (1, 139) = 3.76, 
p=.05. However, main effects of luck-attribution, F (1, 139) = 2.38, p = .13, and 
deterministic luck, F (1,139) =1.17, p = .28, failed to reach significance. Critically, 
simple slopes suggested that luck-attributions were important for social judgments only 
when belief in deterministic luck was low. For participants with deterministic luck lower 
than the median, warmth was negatively correlated with luck attributions, r =-.29, p=.01. 
For participants with deterministic luck greater than the median, warmth did not correlate 
with luck-attributions, r =.00, p=1. Therefore, luck-attributions meant lower perceived 
warmth only for participants who did not believe in the deterministic power of luck. 
Discussion 
Study 1 provided an important starting point in the inquiry of luck and 
perceptions of those who benefit from it. Specifically, Study 1 revealed that most people 
are aware of someone who they would consider “lucky”. In fact, only a handful of 
33 
 
participants failed to describe lucky individuals known to them. Furthermore, most of the 
lucky individuals were classified as friends or close friends. Thus, it seems people do not 
need to look far to find someone who benefits from luck. Therefore, Study 1 established 
the presence of luck-based inferiority in an ecologically valid context. 
Data offered some clear insights into perceptions of luck and lucky individuals. 
Luck-attributions were associated with perceived relative disadvantage (dejection). This 
association suggests that we were able to illustrate the phenomenon of luck-based 
inferiority. Moreover, dejection, luck-attributions, and beliefs in deterministic luck were 
all associated with each other, as well as with social judgments. Specifically, dejection 
predicted lower liking and perceived warmth. Luck-attributions predicted lower warmth. 
Deterministic luck predicted more dejection, higher luck-attributions, and lower 
perceived warmth. Therefore, Study 1establishes that both the perceived relative 
disadvantage as well as the perceived role of luck may undermine social judgments of 
individuals viewed as lucky. 
However, it seems that relative disadvantage in luck-based inferiority was more 
important for social judgments than attributions to luck. Attributions to luck correlated 
negatively with warmth, but not with liking. The correlations between dejection and 
social judgments were relatively stronger. Furthermore, beliefs in the deterministic power 
of luck correlated positively with luck-attributions. 
A comment is in order with regard to the effect of deterministic luck on perceived 
warmth. I found that luck-attributions predict lower warmth when belief in deterministic 
luck is weak. This suggests that luck-based attributions likely challenge the worldview of 
those who do not believe in luck or make them suspicious of the other’s success given 
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that it seems to be obtained through a mechanism they do not believe in. Subsequently, 
such people may perceive lucky others negatively to the extent that they attribute the 
lucky individuals’ circumstances to luck. 
Although Study 1 helped to examine the phenomenon of luck-based inferiority as 
it exists in real life, it suffered from some methodological challenges. First, the observed 
correlations do not serve as evidence for a causal impact of relative disadvantage or 
perceived luck on social judgments. It is likely that the observed associations were driven 
by third variables. Second, certain confounds could have undermined the observation of 
strong associations between key variables. For instance, most of the lucky individuals 
described by participants were close to them (a friend or a close friend). It is plausible 
that closeness with the lucky individuals influenced perceptions of them. In general, the 
lucky individuals were liked and perceived as warm. The strong link between closeness 
and positive social judgments may have thus restricted any negative effects of luck-
attributions and relative disadvantage.  
Studies 2 and 3 were conducted to address the above-mentioned methodological 
constraints of Study 1. Given that the following studies involved experimental 
manipulation of luck and relative disadvantage, they were better able to control for 
confounds. Moreover, in both of the next two studies participants provided social 
judgments of an individual who they did not know. Therefore, it was less likely that 
closeness with the lucky individual would constrain any effect of perceived luck and 
relative disadvantage on social judgments.  
In sum, Study 1 was an important first step in the exploration of luck-based 
inferiority and its impact on social judgments. Relative disadvantage was more important 
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for social judgments than luck-attributions themselves, although both predicted slightly 
more negative linking and warmth. Deterministic luck was associated with perceived 
warmth in an unexpected way (luck-attributions predicted lower warmth when beliefs in 
deterministic luck were weak). Studies 2 and 3 examine and elaborate on these findings 
in an experimental framework. 
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PART II. IMPLIED (VS. ABSENT) LUCK OF ADVANTAGED OTHERS 
The objective of Study 2 was to provide a more stringent test of the causal link 
between luck and negative perceptions of lucky individuals. Participants read about two 
targets that were in the same ‘fortunate’ circumstances, except that luck was portrayed as 
playing a major role for only one of them. Both targets were portrayed as enjoying many 
outcomes that undergraduate participants would want for themselves (being close to 
family, having good roommates, having a good campus job, etc.). Thus, experiences of 
targets were self-relevant for participants and potentially highlighted their personal 
disadvantages.  
Method 
Participants and Design. Two hundred and sixty-three students (65% female, 
mean age 19.2) from a large Midwestern university served as research participants in 
exchange for course credit. The sample size allowed detecting even a modest effect size 
of d=.30 with sufficient power (80%, see Cohen, 1988). Each participant was randomly 
assigned to read one of two articles about a peer (gender neutral). 
 Procedures and Measures. To maintain the cover story, the study was conducted 
in a group therapy clinic at Iowa State University. Upon participants’ arrival to the clinic, 
the experimenter introduced the study as aimed toward understanding “how to enhance 
communication in psychotherapy”. Furthermore, participants were told that one interest is 
to simulate the process of observing a client in therapy. Participants were told that they 
would read snippets taken from actual psychotherapy sessions at the student counseling 
center, and subsequently answer questions about the client. Each snippet was ostensibly 
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an excerpt from a conversation between a therapist and a client. Scripts for each 
condition have been provided below. 
Script for the “Luck Absent” condition 
Therapist: “Today I would like you to think about all the good things in your life. Please 
share with me what it is that you are grateful for in your life, more recently.” 
Client: “Right now? Lets’ see! Here in Ames, I am not at all far from my family. My 
father has a job in Des Moines. It’s nice to be able to go home when I want. I don’t mind 
the 35 minute drive. At ISU, I live in Frederickson Court, which is very convenient. There 
I’ve found good roommates that I became good friends with. Ummm…Recently, I started 
working at the international students’ and scholars’ office. It is the office that is located 
on the third floor of the Memorial Union. I really wanted that job because I want to go 
into international affairs and this might be a good start. I like working there.” 
Therapist: “Please go on.” 
Client: “What else? I’m looking forward to this internship next summer. I will be 
working with a law firm. The internship will start in mid-May and last until August. So, 
that’s about 3 months. In the spring, though, I will study abroad in Spain! I hope things 
will go well!” 
Script for the “Lucky Target” condition 
Therapist: “Today I would like you to think about all the good things in your life. Please 
share with me what it is that you are grateful for in your life, more recently.” 
Client: “Right now? Lets’ see! Actually, I think I tend to be very fortunate. Mostly, good 
things keep happening even when I don’t expect them. So, when I was going to start ISU, 
I was concerned about being far from home. But, a position opened up in Des Moines 
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around the same time, and my father transferred just when I moved. It is so nice to be 
able to go home when I want! At ISU, I have been living in Frederickson Court, which is 
very convenient. I actually had to turn in my application the last minute, but there was 
still room, so I didn’t have to sweat over it! I got some great roommates who I became 
friends with. Actually, my roommates and I applied around the same time and maybe 
that’s why we landed up as roommates? It’s great how it just sort of happened. 
Ummm…Recently, I started working at the international students’ and scholars’ office. I 
really wanted that job because I want to go into international affairs and this might be a 
good start. Luckily one of my roommates happened to work there so that’s how I found 
out about it. If it was not for my roommate, I would never have landed such a great job.” 
Therapist: “Please go on.” 
Client: “What else? I am looking forward to this internship next summer. Again, it’s 
interesting how I got it! A graduating international student was having legal issues. 
Somehow, I got to deal with his paperwork. Through him, I interacted with this law firm 
and that’s where I will do my internship. In the spring, though, I will study abroad in 
Spain! My advisor, where I work, gave me the info about scholarships, and now I get to 
study abroad. Sometimes I wonder how things will go. But, again I am counting on a 
lucky break; I seem to have many of those. 
 Thus, each script created the impression that the client’s life contained many 
desirable experiences (lived close to family, had good roommates, had a good job on 
campus, etc.). In the “Luck Absent” condition, however, the client merely described all 
the good things in life. Conversely, in the “Lucky Target” condition, the client explained 
how those good things happened in interesting and unexpected ways. This client also 
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mentioned the role of favorable luck in their own life. After reading the article, 
participants received a similar questionnaire as in Study 1 (see Appendix B for more 
details). Luck-belief scales and subscales were factor analyzed to extract two factors: 
deterministic luck and personal luckiness (see Table 1 for loadings). 
Results 
 Overall, there was at least partial support for the idea that luck-based inferiority 
leads to less positive social judgments given that perceived relative disadvantage and the 
manipulated luck of the target predicted lower perceived warmth. Although associations 
between luck-beliefs and social judgments were weak, lower beliefs in deterministic luck 
and personal luckiness intensified the effect of target’s luck on more negative social 
judgments. 
Manipulation Checks. As anticipated, the participants who read about the lucky 
target reported stronger luck-attributions (Table 3) compared to the luck-absent 
condition. 
Social Judgments of the Lucky Individual. Means in Table 4 suggest that 
participants thought highly of the “client” in the script. This individual was liked a lot and 
was perceived as highly warm. I hypothesized that perceived relative disadvantage, 
perceived role of luck in another’s advantage, and lay luck-beliefs should predict less 
positive social judgments of the lucky individual. Before examining the hypothesis, I 
present the reported thoughts of one participant who read about the lucky target. The 
participant clearly paid attention to the role of luck in the life of the target. Moreover, the 
script led to a sense of relative disadvantage as the participant thought about ways in 
which the target’s life was relatively better.   
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“I'm glad that their life and luck is going so well, but I'm really jealous because I feel 
like I work really hard and am not getting even half the results the client is. I wish my 
life would fall into place like theirs is. However, I feel like they're taking advantage of 
their luck and not trying as hard as they could be.” 
Table 3. Reactions as a function of target luck in Study 2 
 Luck-Absent 
(n=137) 
Lucky-Target 
(n=126) 
   
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) d t (1-sided) p 
Dejection .93 (1.28) 1.15 (1.64) .14 -1.16 .88 
Luck-Attribution 2.47 (.98) 3.86 (1.05) 1.37 -11.06 <.001 
Like 7.24 (2.01) 6.85 (2.00) -.19 1.55 .06 
Warmth 8.22 (1.14) 7.80 (1.42) -.32 2.59 <.01 
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations in Study 2 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Dejection 1.03 1.47 1      
2. Luck Attribution 3.13 1.23 .15* 1     
3. Like 7.06 2.01 -.07 -.01 1    
4. Warmth 8.02 1.30 -.34** -.20* .40** 1   
5. Deterministic Luck - - .08 .16** .10† .07 1  
6. Personal Luckiness - - -.10† -.06 .02 .01 -.07 1 
Note. ** p<.01, * p<.05,† p=.09. (N= 259-263) 
The Role of Relative Disadvantage in Social Judgments. Perceived relative 
disadvantage was again measured via the dejection index. Overall, participants reported 
extremely low levels of dejection (M=1.03 on a scale of 0 to 11). Manipulation of the 
target’s luck did not alter the sense of dejection experienced by participants (Table 3). 
However, luck-attributions positively correlated with dejection, albeit weakly (Table 4). 
Moreover, although dejection was uncorrelated with liking, it did predict lower perceived 
warmth. Therefore, perceived relative disadvantaged was associated with less positive 
social judgments of the target individual. 
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 The Role of Perceived Luck in Social Judgments. Manipulation of the target’s 
luck affected both social judgments of liking and perceived warmth. As shown in Table 
3, the lucky target was liked less and perceived less warm. However, the effect-size in 
case of both judgments was in the weak to moderate range. In fact, the effect of target on 
liking was only marginally significant. Furthermore, luck-attribution predicted lower 
perceived warmth but was uncorrelated with liking at the zero-order level. 
 Given that the target was not equally lucky in both conditions, it is likely that 
luck-attributions held different meanings for social judgments in the two conditions. For 
instance, luck-attributions might predict social judgments especially when the target is 
seen as lucky. In a multiple regression of liking on target luck, luck-attribution, and an 
interaction term as predictors, the interaction term was significant, F (1,256) = 7.46, 
p<.01, but the main effects of target luck, F (1,256) = 2.52, p = .11 and luck-attribution, F 
(1,256) = 2.12, p =.15, were not quite significant. Simple slopes suggested that luck-
attributions were not associated with liking in the case of the luck-absent target, r=-.12, 
p=.15. However, high luck-attributions predicted more liking for the lucky target, r=.21, 
p=.02. This finding was unexpected. 
 Next, in a multiple regression of warmth on target luck, luck-attribution, and an 
interaction term as predictors, the main effect of luck-attributions was significant, F 
(1,256) = 6.22, p = .01, but the main effect of target luck, F (1,256) <1 and the interaction 
term, F (1,256) = 1.77, p =.18, were not significant. Given that the main effect of 
condition ceased to be significant, results suggest that luck-attributions accounted for the 
effect of target luck on lower perceived warmth. 
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 Luck-Beliefs and Social Judgments. I also hypothesized that beliefs in the 
deterministic power of luck and personal luckiness would negative affect reactions to the 
target’s luck. Results of regression analyses presented next examine interaction between 
the manipulation of target luck and luck-belief factor scores. As in Study 1, different 
luck-belief scales were factor analyzed to extract two factors, namely deterministic luck 
and personal luckiness (see Table 1 for loadings). Extracted factor-scores were again 
used in data analyses. 
 In a multiple regression of liking on target luck, personal luckiness, and an 
interaction term, the interaction effect was marginally significant, F (1,257) = 3.57, p 
=.06. Main effects of target luck, F (1,257) =2.69, p = .10 and personal luckiness, F 
(1,257) =1.17, p=.28 failed to reach significance. Figure 2 illustrates the interaction 
effect. Specifically, for participants with weak beliefs in personal luckiness, target’s luck 
predicted lower liking, t (114) = 2.96, p <.01, d=.54. For participants with strong beliefs 
in personal luckiness, target luck did not predict liking, t (136) = -.79, p = .43, d=.19. In a 
multiple regression of liking on target luck, deterministic luck, and an interaction term, 
the interaction was not significant. 
 
Figure 2. Judgments of liking as a function of personal luckiness and target luck 
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In a multiple regression of warmth on target luck and deterministic luck, the main 
effect of target luck, F (1,257) =6.90, p < .01, and the interaction effect were significant, 
F (1,257) = 3.83, p =.05. The main effect of deterministic luck was not significant, F 
(1,257) < 1. Figure 3 illustrates the interaction effect. Simple effects revealed that for 
participants with weak beliefs in deterministic luck, target luck predicted lower perceived 
warmth, t (118) = 2.83, p <.01, d=.50. For participants with strong beliefs in deterministic 
luck, target luck did not predict warmth, t (136) = -.79, p = .43, d=.14. This finding was 
similar to the observation in Study 1, wherein luck-attributions predicted lower warmth 
when beliefs in deterministic luck were low. However, in a multiple regression of warmth 
on personal luckiness, target luck, and their interaction term, the interaction was not 
significant.
 
Figure 3. Judgments of warmth as a function of deterministic luck and target luck 
Moderated-Mediation of the Effect of Target Luck on Liking via Luck-
Attribution. I hypothesized that beliefs in the deterministic power of luck should sensitize 
people to the implications of luck in the life of the target. If so, luck-attributions should 
be linked to social judgments more strongly in the case of people who hold strong beliefs 
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in deterministic luck (moderated-mediation). A test of moderated-mediation involves 
examining three models. The first model involves a simple moderated regression on the 
outcome variable, in this case predicting liking as a function of the target’s status, 
deterministic luck, and their product term. As per Muller and colleagues (2005), a 
necessary condition for moderated mediation is a main effect of the predictor (in this case 
the target’s manipulated luck) that is not contingent upon the moderator (in this case 
deterministic luck). In a multiple regression of liking on target’s luck, deterministic luck 
and an interaction term, the main effect of target’s luck was not significant, F (1, 257) = 
2.55, p =.11. Therefore, there was no evidence for a moderated mediation (Muller et al., 
2005). 
Moderated-Mediation Effect of Target Luck on Warmth via Luck-Attribution. 
Next, I examined moderated-mediation with warmth as the outcome variable. The first 
model involves a simple moderated regression on the outcome variable, in this case 
predicting warmth as a function of the target’s manipulated luck, deterministic luck, and 
their product term. Given that the effect of target’s luck on warmth was moderated by 
deterministic luck, I examined the second model. The second model is the same, with the 
exception of the dependent variable being the mediator, in this case attributions to luck. 
Both target’s luck, F (1,256) =133.35, p < .01 and deterministic luck, F (1,256) = 5.80, p 
= .02 revealed significant main effects. The third and final model involves predicting the 
outcome variable (warmth) via the same variables as in the first model, with the addition 
of the mediator variable (luck-attributions) and the product term of the mediating and the 
moderating variable (luck- attributions *deterministic luck). In essence, this model allows 
for the mediator’s (partial) effect on the outcome as well as the residual effect of 
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condition on outcome to be moderated. However, the product of luck-attributions and 
deterministic luck was not significant, F (1,253) < 1. Therefore, there was no evidence 
for moderated mediation with deterministic luck as the moderator. 
Discussion 
 Reading about a lucky vs. luck-absent target enabled a focus on the role of luck in 
luck-based inferiority while controlling for relative disadvantage. However, the mean 
levels of dejection were extremely low. This suggests that participants did not necessarily 
think that the target was superior to them or had more advantages than they had. Yet, it 
was clear that the lucky target was liked less and was perceived less warm compared to 
the luck-absent target. In addition, participants perceived less warmth when they made 
luck-based attributions.  
 Although the lucky target was liked less, an unexpected interaction was observed 
in a regression of liking on target’s luck and luck-attributions. Simple slopes suggested 
that whereas luck-attributions were uncorrelated with liking in the luck-absent target, 
luck-attributions predicted more liking in case of the lucky target. A couple of comments 
are in order. First, after having controlled for the condition (target’s luck), it is not exactly 
clear as to what explains the remaining variance in luck-attributions. Therefore, it is hard 
to interpret the association between luck-attributions and liking after controlling for the 
condition. Second, given that dejection was not very strong, it is plausible that 
participants did not see the target as a threatening social comparison target. Therefore, 
luck-based events or outcomes could cause liking in line with the luck preference 
phenomenon discussed earlier. 
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 On the other hand, luck was associated with warmth more consistently than with 
liking. First, perceived warmth was lower for the lucky target. Second, luck-attributions 
negatively correlated with warmth. Therefore, stronger luck-attributions predicted lower 
perceived warmth, as in Study 1. Third, in a multiple regression, luck-attribution 
accounted for the effect of target’s luck on warmth. 
 Beliefs in luck also seemed to play an important role even though there was not 
enough evidence for moderated mediation with luck-attributions as the mediator. 
Specifically, belief in personal luckiness moderated the effect of target’s luck on liking 
and belief in deterministic luck moderated the effect of target’s luck on warmth. In both 
cases, target’s luck affected social judgments only when luck-beliefs were low. When 
personal luckiness was low, the lucky target was liked less than the luck-absent target. 
This suggests that the lucky target was a threatening comparison target for participants 
who did not think they were lucky. Therefore, such participants may have construed the 
“lucky” advantages of the target as unfair or immoral. When deterministic luck was low, 
the lucky target signaled less warmth than the luck-absent target. This suggests that the 
lucky target was a threatening comparison target for participants who did not believe that 
luck can be a deterministic factor in one’s life. Therefore, such participants may have also 
construed the “lucky” advantages of the target as unfair or immoral. However, these 
findings were neither expected nor consistent across the two measures of social 
judgments, so their interpretation should remain tentative. In sum, the findings lend at 
least partial support to hypotheses regarding social judgments amidst luck-based 
inferiority. Importantly, perceived luck in peers’ advantages can make us like them less 
and see them as less warm individuals. Thus, findings of Study 2 clarify social judgments 
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amidst luck-based inferiority and call into scrutiny the well-documented phenomenon of 
luck-preference. Study 3 teases apart another important feature of luck-based inferiority, 
namely relative disadvantage, presented next. 
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PART III. LET’S MAKE A DEAL! 
 Study 3 further advanced understanding of the way lucky individuals are 
perceived and what behavioral consequences that may carry. In Studies 1 and 2, the focus 
was on the role of luck itself. However, in Study 3, I examined the role of self-relevant 
disadvantage—a factor that was also overlooked in the studies that demonstrated the 
‘luck preference’ effect (Olson, 2008; Olson et al., 2006; Olson et al., 2008). In Study 3, 
participants observed a confederate who played a luck-based game. The participant either 
served as an observer of the confederate, or played the game first and lost. Thus, in one 
condition, the luck-based success of the confederate put the participant at a clear relative 
disadvantage. Participants then reported social judgments of the winning confederate. 
Study 3 also included a behavioral task that assessed perceived trust in lucky individuals. 
This was a key test of whether luck-based impressions have consequences for inter-
personal behavior. 
Method 
Participants and Design. One hundred and forty-seven students (63% female) 
from a large Midwestern university served as research participants in exchange for course 
credit. Thirteen participants either expressed suspicion about the purpose of the study or 
were unable to understand the protocol because they were not fluent in English. Data 
from these participants were not included in the analysis. Thus, the total sample size was 
134. This allowed sufficient power (.80) for detecting even a modest effect size of .30 
(Cohen, 1988). Each participant was randomly assigned to one of two conditions: 
observer vs. loser. 
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 Procedures and Measures. Participants were told that the objective of the study 
was to better understand behavior of people in TV game shows. Participants were led to 
believe that there was another participant, who was actually a confederate. The 
confederate played a luck-based game adapted from the TV show “Let’s make a deal!” 
The experimenter served as the host. The game was staged such that the confederate 
‘won’ four out of four games. In the loser condition, the participant first played the luck-
based game adapted from the TV show “Let’s make a deal!” him or herself. The game 
was rigged such that the participant lost in all trials. Finally, participants observed their 
presumed co-participant win four out of the four trials. The observer condition was 
similar to the loser condition with one exception. In the observer condition, participants 
did not play the luck-based game. They simply observed the confederate win.  
 Luck-based Game. In the first game, players were required to open a lock by 
finding the right key in 40 seconds. Ten keys were hung on an artificial tree across the 
room. Every time, the player would pick up a key from the tree, run to the lock and try 
opening it. The confederate knew the location of the correct key. However, the 
confederate grabbed the correct key only on the third attempt. When the participant 
played the game (in the loser condition), the correct key was never hung on the tree to 
prevent victory. The confederate ostensibly won a $15 gift card. 
 In the second game, players were required to flip playing cards spread on a desk. 
To win the game, players needed to find five hearts before they got three spades. To 
ensure victory of the confederate, only two spades were included in the cards. When the 
participant played, there were only four hearts to prevent victory. The confederate 
ostensibly won a dinner for two at a nice local restaurant. 
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 In the third game, players put their hand inside a box to pull out slips with 
numbers written on them. They got four attempts to get a total sum of eighty. To ensure 
victory of the confederate, numbers ten and twenty were written on one slip each. All the 
other slips had thirty written on them. Thus, the confederate got a sum of at least eighty 
(in four attempts). When the participant played (in the loser condition), numbers twenty 
and thirty were written on one slip each. All the other slips had ten written on them. Thus, 
the participant always got a sum less than eighty. The confederate ostensibly won tickets 
to a show of their choice. 
After “losing” the first three games, participants were told that they were not 
eligible for the fourth game, which was to be played “only after the first three games 
were won”. The confederate always played the fourth game. In this game, the confederate 
chose numbers from 1 to 10. These numbers were incorporated with sounds via a 
powerpoint presentation that was projected on a screen. When the confederate chose a 
number, the experimenter clicked on it to play the associated sound. The goal was to 
avoid two “zonk” sounds in four attempts. The confederate knew which numbers were 
associated with “zonk” sounds and chose only one of them. The prize for winning the 
final game was a one-night's stay at an expensive hotel in a nearby city. 
After every victory, the experimenter congratulated the confederate and made 
explicit comments suggesting that the confederate was lucky (e.g., “Most people in this 
study win only one or two games, if at all. You must be really lucky!”). Therefore, the 
confederate was portrayed as equally successful (and lucky) in both conditions. Although 
the actual participant merely observed the confederate’s success in the observer 
condition, in the loser condition the participant lost the first three games before watching 
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the confederate win. Eight female undergraduate students played the role of the 
confederate in different experimental sessions. After the participant lost the games in the 
loser condition, the experimenter needed some time to set up game-materials for the 
confederate. While the experimenter cleared the room and stepped out into the foyer, a 
filler task was utilized to keep participants occupied. Specifically, participants answered 
bogus questions about game shows that they liked to watch. 
After the confederate won the game, participants reported their reactions 
(emotional reactions, luck-attributions, and social judgments), similar to Studies 1 and 2. 
The same scales used in the previous studies were used in Study 3 as well with the 
exception of luck-attributions. In Study 3, luck-attributions were rated on a scale of 0 
(=Not At All) to 11 (=A Great Amount). Note that the confederate was more successful 
than the participant in the loser condition. However, in the observer condition, success of 
the confederate had no direct implications for the participant. 
Behavioral task. A modified version of a trust-game was used as a behavioral 
measure of trust (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Lount, 2010). Participants were told 
that they had been randomly assigned to the role of a sender in a decision-making game. 
They had $40 to “send” to the confederate. They had the option to send all or a part of the 
amount to the “other participant” (confederate). They were told that the experimenter 
would triple the amount sent before giving it to the confederate. The confederate 
ostensibly had the choice to return any amount between $0 and $120. The original 
amount sent served as a behavioral measure of trust.  
The trust game was administered after participants provided ratings of social 
judgments. It was anticipated that that participants would not part with the entire $40 in 
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the trust game. Therefore, positive affect could result from the hope of having received 
money. If social judgment ratings were made after the game of trust, the intermediate 
positive affect could impact judgments. Accordingly, the trust game was administered 
afterward. 
Subsequently, participants completed questionnaires to assess luck-beliefs similar 
to those in previous studies (see Appendix C). Luck-belief scales were factor-analyzed to 
extract factor scores of deterministic luck and personal luckiness (see Table 1 for 
loadings). Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked. 
Results 
I hypothesized that luck-related outcomes of another individual would receive 
greater scrutiny when those outcomes create relative disadvantage. Specifically, social 
judgments should be less positive and money “sent” in the trust-game should be lower in 
the loser condition. Overall, the lucky confederate elicited favorable social judgments. 
Self-reports of liking and perceived warmth were highly positive.  
Manipulation Check. As shown in Table 5, participants accurately attributed the 
confederate’s success to luck. They reported very high luck-attributions in both 
conditions, which is expected given that the games were luck-based. Furthermore, 
perceived relative disadvantage was higher in the loser condition. Specifically, 
participants reported higher levels of dejection in the loser condition compared to the 
observer condition. Thus, losing to the same lucky individual (vs. merely observing the 
lucky individual win) led to greater relative disadvantage. However, it is noteworthy that 
participants did not report high levels of dejection in either condition. Whereas it is 
plausible that they either did not experience intense dejection, it might also be true that 
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participants’ self-reports were not completely valid given the pressure to behave in 
socially desirable ways. 
Table 5. Reactions as a function of Role of the Participant in Study 3 
 Role: Observer 
(n=68) 
Role: Loser 
(n=66) 
   
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) d t (1-sided) p 
Dejection .97 (1.29) 1.47 (1.72) -.33 -1.92 .03 
Luck-Attribution 9.62 (2.32) 9.03 (2.40) .25 1.44 .07 
Like 7.34 (2.36) 6.76 (2.18) .26 1.48 .07 
Warmth 8.90 (1.22) 8.50 (1.59) .28 1.66 .05 
Cash ($) 22.38 (10.77) 18.03 (8.93) .44 2.54 <.01 
 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations in Study 3 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Dejection 1.22 1.53 1       
2. Luck Attribution 9.33 2.36 .16† 1      
3. Like 7.06 2.28 -.02 .28** 1     
4. Warmth 8.70 1.43 -.18* .16† .68** 1    
5. Cash 20.26 10.11 -.11 -.07 .20* .18* 1   
6. Deterministic Luck - - .13 .23* -.01 -.02 .03 1  
7. Personal Luckiness - - -.14 -.01 .14 .11 .07 -.06 1 
Note. ** p<.01, * p<.05,† p=.06. (N’s between 120-134) 
The Role of Relative Disadvantage in Social Judgments. The lucky confederate 
in the loser (vs. observer) condition elicited less positive judgments (Table 5). 
Participants reported less liking and perceived warmth in the loser condition. Although 
the difference in warmth across condition was significant, the difference in liking was 
only marginally significant. Therefore, relative disadvantage in luck-based inferiority was 
at least somewhat important for shaping perceptions of lucky individuals. 
 In the trust-game, participants “sent” less money to the lucky confederate in the 
loser (vs. observer) condition. On average, the difference in amount “sent” was $3.30, or 
almost 8% of the total amount of many at hand. This again suggests that participants in 
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the loser condition did not trust the confederate as much. If they did, they would have 
utilized the opportunity to “send” more money in hopes of better returns. 
 Participants’ reports of relative disadvantage, namely dejection, also served to test 
links between relative disadvantage and social judgments. Dejection predicted lower 
perceived warmth (Table 6). Although dejection negatively correlated with cash, the 
correlation was not significant. Furthermore, dejection was uncorrelated with liking. 
Thus, there was at least partial support for links between relative disadvantage 
and negative social judgments. Losing to, rather than merely observing, a lucky target 
predicted less positive social judgments (lower perceived warmth and liking) and lower 
trust behavior. In addition, self-reports of dejection predicted lower perceived warmth. 
The Role of Luck in Social Judgments. Contrary to the expectations, attributions 
of the confederate’s success to luck predicted more positive social judgments. 
Attributions to luck correlated positively with liking and perceived warmth, although the 
correlation with warmth was only marginally significant. These correlations are 
inconsistent with hypotheses about luck-based inferiority. Instead, they support the luck-
preference phenomenon. 
The Role of Luck-Beliefs in Social Judgments. Two factors of deterministic luck 
and personal luckiness were extracted from luck-belief scales (see Table 1 for factor-
loadings). Beliefs in deterministic luck predicted stronger attributions to luck (Table 5). 
However, neither of the luck-belief factors correlated with any other variables at the zero-
order level.  
I tested various regression models with liking, perceived warmth, or cash as 
dependent variables. The predictors were the role of the participant, a luck-belief factor 
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(deterministic luck or personal luckiness), and their product terms. Neither the main 
effect of any luck-belief factor, nor the interaction term were significant, F’s<1, except in 
the case of the following model. 
In a multiple regression of liking on the experimentally-manipulated role of the 
participant, personal luckiness, and an interaction term, the interaction term was 
significant, F (1, 117) = 6.47, p = .01. Tests of simple slopes revealed that whereas 
personal luckiness did not predict liking in the observer condition, ρ = -.07, p = .52, 
personal luckiness predicted greater liking in the loser condition, ρ = .35, p< .01. Given 
the large number of analyses and the unexpected nature of this particular finding, 
however, it should be treated with caution. 
Discussion  
In short, Study 3 helped isolate the role played by relative disadvantage in the 
way lucky individuals are perceived. Study 3 also measured trust in an actual behavioral 
task (an advance over previous studies). As expected, participants reacted differently to 
the same lucky target contingent on their relationship to the target. When participants lost 
in the luck-based game (prior to observing the confederate win), they reported less liking 
and less perceived warmth. Subsequently, participants had the opportunity to share some 
money with the confederate with the hope of a monetary return. The more money they 
shared, the bigger return they could expect provided they trusted the confederate. 
Participants in the loser condition gave less money, suggesting that they trusted the 
confederate less compared to the observer condition. Among the luck-belief factors, only 
personal luckiness correlated with liking (in the loser condition). This may suggest that 
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when people do not consider themselves to be lucky, they would like a lucky individual 
(who is also better-off than them) less. 
Although data were generally consistent with my original hypotheses regarding 
luck, relative disadvantage and social judgments, the observed effects were not very 
strong. For instance, liking and perceived warmth were very high regardless of the role of 
the participant. Given that participants interacted with the confederate, it is plausible that 
the role of the participant was but one of the factors that influenced their reactions toward 
and perceptions of the confederate. All the confederates were well-dressed, well-behaved, 
polite, and courteous women in their early twenties. Therefore, it makes sense that they 
elicited highly positive social judgments. 
 It is also the case that participants reported extremely low levels of dejection, 
regardless of their role. Thus, it is questionable whether they experienced strong relative 
disadvantage. I did not ask participants whether (or the extent to which) they would have 
liked to win the luck-game. It is plausible that not all participants were invested in 
winning a luck-game for some prizes. Even if they were, they probably did not construe 
their loss as a sign of a personal lack. With this in mind, it may not be surprising that 
luck-attributions predicted greater liking and warmth. 
Nevertheless, relative disadvantage in the context of luck-based inferiority 
predicted less positive social judgments and lower trust toward the lucky confederate. 
Note that cash “sent” in the trust game also correlated positive with liking and warmth, 
consistent with the assumptions that the trust game reveals one’s level of trust or good 
will. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Research Objectives 
Our social experiences often make us realize that we are not in control of our 
environment. We might want certain things and work hard toward them, but we are not 
always successful. Yet, there is no dearth of people who are further ahead toward those 
goals who seem to have it much better than we do. We all know people who seem to be 
happier, make more money than we do, are smarter, more intelligent, more good looking, 
or more popular than us. Whereas some of these better-off individuals inspire us to have 
what they have, others make us contemplate the reasons for our relative lack.  
What if there was no good reason? Not uncommonly, some people are better-off 
than us due to purely external factors. This dissertation took a closer look at such 
instances of luck-based inferiority. Specifically, I focused on social judgments elicited by 
lucky individuals: do we like them, or think that they have good intentions? The extant 
psychological literature does not provide unequivocal answers to this question. Research 
in the luck-preference domain predicts that lucky individuals ought to be seen in a 
positive light. Research in the envy domain predicts that superior others ought to be seen 
in a negative light, especially when differences are considered unattainable (Elster, 1998). 
However, findings from these different research domains are not generalizable to luck-
based inferiority for reasons noted earlier in the introduction. 
I hypothesized that two factors would determine social judgments elicited by 
others advantaged by luck, namely perceived relative disadvantage and attributing 
another’s advantage to luck. Perceived relative disadvantage would reflect self-relevance 
and a heightened scrutiny of the situation and its implications. Attributions to luck would 
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denote attention to the role of external factors in another’s advantage. I hypothesized that 
both of these factors would create more negative social judgments amidst luck-based 
inferiority. Moreover, luck-related beliefs were expected to sensitize people to the role of 
luck in others’ lives. Therefore, the presence of luck-related beliefs should have 
intensified the effect of perceived relative disadvantage and attributions to luck. 
Hypotheses were examined in a set of three studies where participants reported their 
perceptions of another individual. Critically, my predictions were more in line with 
findings from the envy domain, i.e., lucky individuals should be viewed negatively in the 
context of luck-based inferiority. These predictions were based on the notions that (1) 
luck-based relative disadvantage could thwart one’s need for competence because it is not 
clear how one may reduce the disparity, and (2) it could also be perceived as a violation 
of fairness, especially luck egalitarianism.  
Partial Support for the Role of Luck in Social Judgments. My interest was in 
examining the role of luck-attributions in shaping perceptions of those who benefit from 
luck. The important question was whether perceived luck translates into social 
judgments, namely liking and perceived warmth. Regarding this core hypothesis, the 
findings were mixed. Luck-attributions were very weakly associated with social 
judgments of lucky individuals in peoples’ own social circles (Study 1). Although the 
correlations were in the expected direction, luck-attributions did not seem to play a 
considerable role in how lucky others were viewed. This is understandable given that 
these lucky individuals were very close to participants in the study. Whereas Study 1 data 
constituted only weak evidence, they point toward the need for better methodological 
control—a more representative sample of lucky individuals. Given that the lucky 
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individuals described by participants were very close to participants, these lucky 
individuals were probably only a subset of lucky individuals who might also be known to 
participants. Note that the self-evaluation maintenance model would suggest that the 
success of a close other could also improve liking (Tesser, 1991, 1998). Therefore, it is 
likely that the methodology prevented a precise estimation of the links between luck-
attributions and social judgments. 
Study 2 and 3 addressed the potential methodological constraints of Study 1. In 
Study 2, participants read about a peer who enjoyed several good outcomes. Information 
about this peer was created for the purpose of the study. Thus, participants were not 
familiar with the peer. Therefore, actual closeness could not have influenced their social 
judgments. In Study 3, participants provided social judgments of a confederate who they 
did not know before the start of the study. Once again, it was unlikely that closeness 
could have shaped social judgments. 
In the case of Study 2, luck-attributions played a meaningful role by explaining 
the link between target’s luck and perceived warmth. However, luck-attributions 
correlated with greater liking in the case of the lucky target. This was not an isolated 
finding. In Study 3 as well, luck-attributions predicted more liking and warmth. These 
findings contradict the hypotheses regarding luck-based inferiority. A close look at 
dejection ratings helps to clarify this unexpected finding. In both Studies 2 and 3, 
participants reported extremely low dejection. Thus, although they correctly attributed 
outcomes to luck (when appropriate), they did not necessarily feel that the lucky 
individual was better than them in a self-relevant manner. Self-relevance was 
hypothesized as a key ingredient of luck-based inferiority. In the absence of self-
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relevance, it is no surprise that findings were somewhat consistent with the phenomenon 
of luck preference. As such, data did not support the idea that the endorsement of luck in 
another individual’s advantage elicits negative social judgments, although experimentally 
manipulating luck of another seemed to have such an effect. 
Support for the Role of Relative Disadvantage in Social Judgments. There was 
more clear support regarding the role of relative disadvantage in luck-based inferiority. 
Although participants in all studies reported low levels of dejection, dejection was 
consistently associated with social judgments. Dejection predicted lower perceived 
warmth in all studies. Whereas dejection correlated negatively with liking, the correlation 
was significant only in Study 1. Moreover, in Study 3, participants who experienced 
relative disadvantage (loser condition) reported less liking and perceived warmth and 
“sent” less money to the confederate in a trust-game. 
Nevertheless, reports of low dejection are a matter of concern from the 
perspective of studying luck-based inferiority. In the absence of dejection, luck-based 
inferiority would likely lack its core characteristic of self-relevance. Therefore, negative 
reactions would not be expected. This was reflected in the generally high ratings of liking 
and warmth across all studies. Therefore, a stronger manipulation of relative 
disadvantage was probably necessary. 
Inconsistent Evidence for the Role of Luck-Beliefs in Social Judgments. It was 
also anticipated that the findings in the context of luck-based inferiority would be 
stronger for people who believe in the deterministic power of luck and in personal 
luckiness. Deterministic luck was expected to predict stronger attributions to luck—this 
was observed in all three studies. Personal luckiness was expected to guard people from 
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the negative repercussions of social comparison with lucky others. Although personal 
luckiness predicted lower dejection, the correlations were very weak.  
In Studies 2 and 3, I tested whether luck-beliefs interacted with experimentally 
manipulated perceived luck of another or one’s own relative disadvantage. Thus, it was 
possible to test whether deterministic luck or personal luckiness intensified or curbed the 
effect of luck-based inferiority on social judgments. In Study 2, target’s luck predicted 
lower liking (but not warmth) for participants with weak beliefs in personal luckiness (but 
not deterministic luck). Conversely, again in Study 2, target luck predicted lower 
perceived warmth (but not linking) for participants with weak beliefs in deterministic 
luck (but not personal luckiness). In Study 3, personal luckiness predicted greater liking 
in the loser condition. No other main or interaction effects were observed with luck-
beliefs or a product term involving luck-beliefs as predictors. Moreover, there was no 
evidence for moderated-mediation via luck-attributions. Thus, there was no clear 
evidence for a systematic effect of luck-beliefs. If anything, beliefs in personal luckiness 
buffered the negative impact on social judgments—a finding, which tentatively suggest 
that not accepting luck as a force may frustrate judgments of others benefiting from luck. 
Implications for Inherent Inequalities 
Luck-based differences point toward a special kind of inequalities, which I would 
call inherent inequalities. External factors often create important social inequalities 
because some people start out in life with important advantages over others. Such 
inequalities are inherent because people have very little control over them. Winning the 
genetic lottery can bestow a lifelong impact on domains like physical health, intelligence, 
and attractiveness. To elaborate, attractive people “luck out” for life given that others 
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treat them nicely; they have more choices in romantic partners, and more power in 
relationships. Inequalities in terms of family wealth, emotional stability, creativity, and 
sense of humor are some other examples of inherent inequalities.  
Inherent inequalities (or advantages accrued from them) are not immune to 
standards of fairness discussed earlier in this research. Distributive fairness stands 
violated by the very nature of unequal distribution of intelligence or attractiveness. 
Procedural fairness stands violated in light of the arbitrary process by which allocation 
(of intelligence or attractiveness) occurs. The complex standard of luck egalitarianism 
stands violated because advantages resulting from naturally bestowed traits would not 
necessarily reflect “choices with respect to income and leisure, but myriad forms of lucky 
and unlucky circumstance” (Cohen 2000, p. 130).  
In addition to being objectively unfair, inherent inequalities correctly yield 
perceptions of injustice. Some insights come from research on the emotion of envy, 
which is likely to arise in the event of inherent inequalities. Smith and Kim (2007) 
contend that resentment is a part of the experience of envy. The sense of injustice in envy 
also has important implications for depressive feelings that accompany the emotion of 
envy (Smith et al., 1994). 
Yet, the unfairness of inherent inequalities is not always recognized. First, it is 
believed that the sense of unfairness in envy is not legitimate (Heider, 1958). Even 
researchers, who acknowledge perceived unfairness in the experience of envy, tend to 
give it a secondary status.  As such, injustice perceived during the experience of envy is 
considered unjust only by subjective standards and not by objective standards (Smith & 
Kim, 2007; Smith et al., 1994). This is not much different from everyday life, wherein 
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there is a strong pressure to suppress reactions to inherent inequalities (as is evident in 
sanctions against admitting or expressing envy). Hence, generally we do not encourage 
discussions about unfairness of inherent inequalities. Therefore, despite clear violations 
of fairness standards, inherent inequalities are not consensually viewed as unfair.  
Implications for Research on Unfairness in Relative Disadvantage 
The oversight of the unfairness in inherent inequalities has probably limited 
scholarship in the areas of fairness and relative disadvantage. Although there is no dearth 
of research on the formation of fairness judgments (Blader, 2007; Van den Bos, Vermunt, 
&Wilke, 1997), attitudes toward the system of allocation (Ambrose, Hess, & Ganesan, 
2007), reactions toward authorities (Van Dijke & De Cremer, 2010), and effects of 
fairness on performance and cooperation (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Zapata-Phelan, 
Colquitt, Scott, & Livingston, 2009), research on unfairness of luck-based or naturally 
occurring inequalities has been few and far between. 
Furthermore, research that does address unfairness amidst relative disadvantage 
denotes a restricted conceptualization of fairness. For instance, in a study that tried to 
distinguish envy from resentment, participants responded to scenarios describing a 
student with a record of either high or average achievement that followed high or low 
effort (Feather & Sherman, 2002). Effort served as a proxy for fairness (or deservedness, 
in this context). There are two problems with this operationalization. First, in this study, 
low effort (which was a proxy for unfairness) was operationalized as cheating. Thus, 
unfairness was confounded with unethical behavior, which points to a flawed 
understanding of unfairness in social inequalities. Equating unfairness with unethical 
behavior is especially problematic for inherent inequalities, of which luck-based 
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differences are one good example. It is beyond doubt that a naturally good-looking 
person did not obtain the good looks via unethical means. 
Second, whereas equating unfairness with unethical behavior has its 
shortcomings, equating fairness with hard work also falls short. In the study just 
mentioned, high effort (a proxy for fairness) was operationalized as hard work. On the 
surface, hard work and cheating seem to accurately denote high and low effort, 
respectively. However, operationalization of fairness via effort in this manner creates the 
additional factor of responsibility for one’s outcomes. A key feature of luck-based 
differences is the absence of agency—the lucky individual is not responsible in any way. 
Therefore, past research on relative disadvantage is not generalizable to the 
phenomenon of inherent inequalities in general, or luck-based differences in particular. 
Future research on reactions to social inequalities might benefit from removing agency 
from the advantaged individual. To this end, the manipulated luck of the target individual 
in Study 2 offers a novel way to capture the lack of responsibility for one’s outcomes. 
Another example of isolating responsibility for outcomes in the study of relative 
disadvantage is offered by Johar and Krizan (2014). In this research, participants 
provided reactions to relatively advantaged individuals, where the advantage was 
attributable to external circumstances. Specifically, participants read hypothetical 
scenarios, wherein their teammate got a higher bonus. Their supervisor who behaved 
either fairly or unfairly in determining the bonuses took allocation decisions. The 
researchers found that the blameless teammate received more negative reactions (envy, 
hostility, and resentment) contingent on actions of the supervisor. Thus, this work 
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suggests another way to disentangle unfairness from responsibility and immoral or 
unethical behaviors. 
Implications for the Luck-Preference Effect 
Research on the luck preference effect suggests that people tend to prefer lucky 
individuals: lucky individuals are liked; and people associate good intentions with them 
(Olson, 2008). My goal was to examine whether the luck preference effect would be 
observed even in the case of luck-based inferiority. Given the mixed findings regarding 
perceived luck and social judgments, an easy answer is hard to come by. Whereas 
individuals sometimes elicited less positive social judgments owing to their luck (Study 1 
and 2), in other cases individuals elicited more positive social judgments owing to their 
luck (Study 3). Therefore, more research is needed as findings do not settle the debate. 
Next, I discuss limitations of the work and directions for future research, to make better 
sense of the findings. 
Limitations 
It seems that none of the three studies captured the phenomenon of luck-based 
inferiority where it hurts the most. Across all studies, participants reported extremely low 
levels of dejection. Therefore, it is not clear whether participants experienced strong 
relative disadvantage. Relative disadvantage arises when someone’s condition is less 
favorable compared to another party that is better-off (in a self-relevant domain). It seems 
that the majority of participants did not see their own lives as any less favorable than 
those of the comparison target, be it a lucky individual in their lives, a “client” in therapy, 
or the lucky confederate. Given that participants were not necessarily desperate for the 
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“advantages” that the target had, it makes sense that they were not affected by the fact 
that those “advantages” were bestowed by luck. 
Future Directions 
A future investigation of luck-based inferiority would definitely benefit from 
employing a stronger sense of relative disadvantage amongst participants. This has 
implications for all the three studies in this dissertation. In the case of Study 1, it might 
help to guide participants’ recall of lucky individuals they know. For instance, instead of 
asking them to think about someone who repeatedly benefits from luck, they should be 
instructed to think of something that they struggle with in life, but something that 
someone else they know doesn’t at all. In the case of Study 2, a stronger sense of relative 
disadvantage could be induced by modifying the “counseling report” read by the 
participants. It is likely that participants discounted the advantages of the target in Study 
2 given that receiving therapy is stigmatized in society. In the case of Study 3, it might 
help to modify the loser condition. It is likely that participants did not take their loss too 
seriously given that they did not feel entitled to any of the prizes. However, it might make 
a difference if they won a couple of the games, but eventually lost everything. Thus, the 
protocol could be adjusted such that participants feel greater relative disadvantage. 
Another direction for future research is to use a more specific measure of luck-
attributions, which were inconsistently associated with social judgments. Whereas luck-
attributions predicted less positive social judgments in the first two studies, they 
positively correlated with social judgments in the final study which involved face-to-face 
interaction. This discrepancy also suggests a potential confusion regarding the 
psychological meaning of luck. By definition, luck refers to two different things: one’s 
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favorable circumstances and an external causal force. Some may also confuse luck for the 
more “even-handed” force of chance (Keren, 1994). In order to better assess luck-
attributions, participants could be asked to report attributions of circumstances to 
“external factors” and to “chance”. They could be asked more directed questions such as 
whether the target individual has an inherent ability to attract luck. 
Conclusion 
The outcomes of even the most deserving and hard-working people are at the 
mercy of a host of external factors or luck. In so doing, Lady Luck is often selective about 
whom she chooses to favor. Luck-based inferiority deals with this very kind of relative 
disadvantage: one in which another’s advantage is attributable to external factors such as 
luck. I hypothesized and found that those who are relatively disadvantaged do not always 
form positive social judgments of those better-off. Taken together, perceived luck and 
perceived relative disadvantage predicted less liking and perceived warmth. Moreover, 
relative advantage predicted lower trust in a behavioral task. However, the observed 
associations were often weak and in some cases, findings contradicted the hypotheses. 
Potential limitations suggest that contradicting findings could be a result of 
methodological limitations such as closeness or similarity to the comparison targets. 
Although additional research would certainly clarify the role of luck and relative 
disadvantage, it is clear that luck-based inferiority is important for social judgments. 
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APPENDIX A: STUDY 1 REACTIONS TOWARD THE LUCKY INDIVIDUAL 
Emotional Reactions questionnaire 
You just described a person you know. Now, please take a moment to think about the 
emotions you experience toward this person, in general. Given below are certain 
emotional reactions that you might have experienced. Some of them might be feelings 
directed toward the person. Please indicate how you feel, by selecting the appropriate 
response for each reaction listed below. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
None At All           Great Amount 
 
1. ____ Cold toward     9.____ Liking for   17. ____ Proud of         25.____ Inspired by 
       yourself 
2. ____ Envious of  10.____ Hostile             18.____ Warm            26.____ Contempt  
                   respect for         for 
3. ____ Jealous of  11. ____ Frustrated by   19. ____ Longing      27.____  Ashamed 
4. ____ Annoyed by    12.____ Disgusted by     20.____ Admiring       28.____ Pity for 
5. ____ Sympathy for  13.____ Indignant      21.____ Compassion   29.____Depressed 
    toward 
6. ____ Inferior to       14.____ Happy for      22.____ Self-lacking    30.____ Pleased      
           for 
7. ____ Resentful        15.____ Grudge               23.____ Superior to     31.___Disrespect    
    against                                                                   for 
8. ____ High regard    16.____ Angry at      24.____ Competitive    32.___ Resentful  
 for         envy toward 
 
Note: Items 6, 22, 27, and 29 were used to measure dejection 
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Attributions 
If you had to explain the circumstances of the lucky individual you just described, how 
important do you think was each of the following factors? Please circle your response by 
using the following scale 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all      Very much 
 
Their level of ability or talent: 1 2 3 4 5 
Their level of effort:   1 2 3 4 5 
Sheer Luck:   1 2 3 4 5 
 
Personality Impressions 
Please give your impression of the lucky individual you described on the following traits 
by selecting a number on the scale below that best fits your view and then entering it in 
the space next to each item. Some of these questions might be hard, but please try your 
best. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
None At All           Great Amount 
 
 1. ____Likeable 8. ____Trustworthy  15. ____ Mediocre     
 2.  ____Arrogant 9.  ____Confident  16.  ____Poised   
 3. ____Selfish  10. ____Self-Centered 17. ____Fortunate   
 4. ____Friendly 11.  ____Conceited  18. ____Ethical 
 5. ____Genuine 12. ____Dishonest  19. ____Lucky  
 6. ____ Gifted  13. ____Intelligent  20. ____Deserving 
 7. ____Advantaged 14. ____ Moral  21. ____Hard-working 
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APPENDIX B: STUDY 2 REACTIONS TOWARD THE “CLIENT” IN THERAPY 
Mood Control Measure 
Please indicate how you are feeling toward the client in the counseling report by selecting 
a number on the scale below that best fits your feelings and then entering it in the space 
next to each item.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
None At All           Great Amount 
 
1. ____ Cold toward     9.____ Liking for   17. ____ Proud of         25.____ Inspired by 
       yourself 
2. ____ Envious of  10.____ Hostile             18.____ Warm            26.____ Contempt  
                   respect for         for 
3. ____ Jealous of  11. ____ Frustrated by   19. ____ Longing      27.____  Ashamed 
4. ____ Annoyed by    12.____ Disgusted by     20.____ Admiring       28.____ Pity for 
5. ____ Sympathy for  13.____ Indignant      21.____ Compassion   29.____Depressed 
    toward 
6. ____ Inferior to       14.____ Happy for      22.____ Self-lacking    30.____ Pleased      
           for 
7. ____ Resentful        15.____ Grudge               23.____ Superior to     31.___Disrespect    
    against                                                                   for 
8. ____ High regard    16.____ Angry at      24.____ Competitive    32.___ Resentful  
 for         envy toward 
 
Note: Items 6, 22, 27, and 29 were used to measure dejection 
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Interpersonal Understanding 
If you had to explain the life of the person in the counseling report, how important do you 
think was each of the following factors. Please circle your response by using the 
following scale 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all      Very much 
 
Their level of ability or talent: 1 2 3 4 5 
Their level of effort:    1 2 3 4 5 
Sheer Luck:    1 2 3 4 5 
 
Personality Impressions 
Please give your impression of the client in the counseling report on the following traits 
by selecting a number on the scale below that best fits your view and then entering it in 
the space next to each item. Some of these questions might be hard, but please try your 
best. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
None At All           Great Amount 
 
 1. ____Likeable  8. ____Advantaged  15. ____Intelligent  
 2.  ____Arrogant 9. ____Trustworthy  16. ____ Moral    
 3. ____Selfish  10.  ____Confident  17. ____ Mediocre      
 4. ____Friendly  11. ____Self-Centered  18.  ____Poised   
 5. ____Genuine  12.  ____Conceited  19. ____Fortunate  
 6. ____ Gifted  13. ____Dishonest  20. ____Ethical 
 7. ____ Lucky  14. ____Hard-working  21. ____Deserving 
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APPENDIX C: REACTIONS TOWARD THE LUCKY INDIVIDUAL 
Interpersonal Understanding 
Understanding of Life Circumstances 
If you had to explain the victory of the contestant, how important do you think was each 
of the following factors. Please circle your response by using the following scale 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all      Very much 
 
Their level of ability or talent: 1 2 3 4 5 
Their level of effort:   1 2 3 4 5 
Sheer Luck:   1 2 3 4 5 
 
Personality Impressions 
Please give your impression of the contestant on the following traits by selecting a 
number on the scale below that best fits your view and then entering it in the space next 
to each item. Some of these questions might be hard, but please try your best. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
None At All           Great Amount 
 
 1. ____Likeable   8. ____Advantaged  15. ____Intelligent  
 2.  ____Arrogant  9. ____Trustworthy  16. ____ Moral    
 3. ____Selfish  10.  ____Confident  17. ____ Mediocre      
 4. ____Friendly  11. ____Self-Centered  18.  ____Poised   
 5. ____Genuine  12.  ____Conceited  19. ____Fortunate  
 6. ____ Gifted  13. ____Dishonest  20. ____Ethical 
 7. ____ Lucky  14. ____Hard-working  21. ____Deserving 
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Mood Control Measure 
Please indicate how you are feeling toward the your co-participant by selecting a number 
on the scale below that best fits your feelings and then entering it in the space next to 
each item.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
None At All           Great Amount 
 
1. ____ Cold toward     9.____ Liking for   17. ____ Proud of         25.____ Inspired by 
       yourself 
2. ____ Envious of  10.____ Hostile             18.____ Warm            26.____ Contempt  
                   respect for         for 
3. ____ Jealous of  11. ____ Frustrated by   19. ____ Longing      27.____  Ashamed 
4. ____ Annoyed by    12.____ Disgusted by     20.____ Admiring       28.____ Pity for 
5. ____ Sympathy for  13.____ Indignant      21.____ Compassion   29.____Depressed 
    toward 
6. ____ Inferior to       14.____ Happy for      22.____ Self-lacking    30.____ Pleased      
           for 
7. ____ Resentful        15.____ Grudge               23.____ Superior to     31.___Disrespect    
    against                                                                   for 
8. ____ High regard    16.____ Angry at      24.____ Competitive    32.___ Resentful  
 for         envy toward 
 
Note: Items 6, 22, 27, and 29 were used to measure dejection 
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APPENDIX D: LUCK-BELIEF SCALES 
The rest of this questionnaire is about you. Please respond to all questions after reading 
carefully. Your honesty is appreciated. 
Beliefs in Luck and Luckiness Scale (BILLS) 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. Choose an 
appropriate number from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree), and write it before 
each item.  
___ 1. I believe in good and bad luck 
___ 2. I try hard to be nice 
___ 3. I mostly have bad luck 
___ 4. There is no such thing as good or bad luck 
___ 5. It’s hard to be nice 
___ 6. I’m not lucky 
___ 7. Good and bad luck really do exist 
___ 8. I generally have good luck 
___ 9. I’m nice if I try 
___ 10. Luck doesn’t affect what happens to me 
___ 11. I consider myself a lucky person 
___ 12. Belief in luck is completely sensible 
___ 13. It’s nice to try hard 
___ 14. Bad luck happens to me often 
___ 15. Luck only exists in peoples’ minds 
___ 16. I’m usually lucky 
 
 
 
85 
 
 
Darke & Freedman Belief Around Luck Scale (DFBALS) 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. Choose an appropriate 
number from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree), and write it before each item.  
___ 1  I consider myself to be an unlucky person 
___ 2  I consistently have bad luck  
___ 3  Even the things in life I can control in life don’t go my way because I am unlucky  
___ 4  Luck works against me  
___ 5  I often feel like it’s my unlucky day  
___ 6  I mind leaving things to chance because I am an unlucky person  
___ 7  Even the things in life I can’t control tend to go my way because I’m lucky  
___ 8  I consistently have good luck  
___ 9  I often feel like it’s my lucky day  
___ 10  Luck works in my favor 
___ 11  I consider myself to be a lucky person  
___ 12  I don’t mind leaving things to chance because I’m a lucky person  
___ 13  It’s a mistake to base any decisions on how unlucky you feel  
___ 14  Being unlucky is nothing more than random  
___ 15  It’s a mistake to base any decisions on how lucky you feel  
___ 16  Being lucky is nothing more than random  
___ 17  Some people are consistently lucky, and others are unlucky  
___ 18  Some people are consistently unlucky, and others are lucky  
___ 19  There is such a thing as good luck that favors some people, but not others 
___ 20  There is such a thing as bad luck that affects some people more than others 
___ 21  Luck plays an important part in everyone’s life  
___ 22  I believe in Luck 
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Belief In Good Luck Scale (BIGL) 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. Choose an appropriate 
number from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree), and write it before each item.  
___ 1. Luck plays an important part in everyone’s life 
___ 2. Some people are consistently lucky, and others are unlucky. 
___ 3. I consider myself to be a lucky person. 
___ 4. I believe in luck. 
___ 5. I often feel like it’s my lucky day. 
___6. I consistently have good luck. 
___ 7. It’s a mistake to base any decisions on how lucky you feel. 
___ 8. Luck works in my favor. 
___ 9. I don’t mind leaving things to chance because I’m a lucky person. 
___ 10. Even the things in life I can’t control tend to go my way because I’m lucky. 
___ 11. There is such a thing as luck that favors some people, but not others. 
___ 12. Luck is nothing more than random chance. 
